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1Introduction and methodology
Between 2013 and 2016, civil society in 22 countries carried out an Enabling 
Environment National Assessment (EENA). The EENA is a civil society-led process 
that analyses the extent to which national conditions enable the work of civil 
society.1 The EENA analysis explores in particular how laws and regulations relating 
to civil society are implemented in practice, and how they impact on civil society. 
The assessments, led by national civil society partners, employed a common 
methodology that encompassed interviews with key stakeholders, consultations, 
focus groups and desk research. In every country, six core dimensions were 
assessed: the ability of civil society groups to form, operate and access resources - 
all aspects of the freedom of association - plus the freedoms of peaceful assembly 
and expression, and relations between civil society and governments. 
Key overall findings
Civil society organisations (CSOs) should be able to form and function independently 
and without having to seek permission from or notify state agencies: this should be 
recognised as international best practice. However, across the 22 EENA countries, 
CSOs of many kinds must register with or notify the authorities when they form, 
and seek legal existence. Several countries have notification regimes - in which 
CSOs can form, operate, hold events, communicate and receive resources without 
having to receive prior permission from state agencies - and, while falling short of 
best practice, these are recognised to be more enabling than approval regimes, in 
which CSOs must seek permission to carry out these core functions. 
The EENA research reveals that in many cases, CSOs are not free to act without 
the state’s permission. This is the case even in several countries where notification 
regimes exist on paper but do not apply in practice, as state agencies, officials 
and security forces assume powers to veto CSO activities. The impact of these 
constraints is to absorb the energy and resources of civil society, and reduce its 
ability to respond creatively to the challenges of the day.
Across the EENA countries, civil society’s assessment is that the laws and 
regulations that affect civil society are often disenabling. Such laws and 
regulations frequently undermine provisions in constitutions that claim to 
recognise the importance of citizens’ participation. In a number of countries, 
laws have been passed in recent years that worsen the environment for civil 
society by restricting the fundamental civil society rights of association, peaceful 
assembly and expression. Restrictions are often made on grounds such as the 
protection of national security and public order, and the prevention of terrorism, 
but they have the effect of making it harder for CSOs to form and function. 
Across the 22 countries, many more disenabling laws than enabling laws have 
recently been passed.
Challenges also arise from inadequate and incoherent legal and regulatory 
regimes that have not kept pace with the contemporary development of civil 
society. Laws and regulations are disenabling wherever they leave scope for their 
1  The 22 EENA countries are: Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, 
Honduras, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. See Annex 1 for a list of national partners and dates of assessments.
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2politicised and selective interpretation, and the exercise of discretion by political 
leaders and public officials. 
The national environment is not uniform for CSOs. CSOs experience restriction 
more when they raise concerns with which governments disagree, or work 
on issues that are contested or seen as controversial. CSOs experience most 
restriction when they seek democracy, good governance and human rights, as 
opposed to when they prioritise charitable or social welfare activity, and when 
they engage in advocacy, express dissent or attempt to exercise accountability, 
compared to when they deliver services. In the worst cases, restrictions in the 
environment for CSOs suggest a deliberate attempt by governments to limit the 
roles that CSOs can play and the topics they can work on, and to constrain the 
autonomy and hinder the effectiveness of CSOs.
CSOs do not want an environment that is free of laws and regulations. 
Rather, they want laws and regulations that recognise their autonomy and 
the important role they play in society, and that help them to demonstrate 
their legitimacy and enable them to work more effectively. CSOs want laws 
and regulations that are predictable, manageable, transparent and free from 
political interference. Enabling legal environments are needed to help ensure 
that CSOs can play a full range of roles, including to partner with governments 
and others to advance social change.
Findings on the six EENA dimensions
CSO formation: Laws and regulations on the formation and registration of CSOs 
are often complex, unwieldy, expensive and, in some cases, out-dated. Smaller, 
rural and less formal CSOs in particular can struggle with these. In countries 
where CSOs must register, there are many concerns about the predictability 
and neutrality of registration procedures, and the ways in which they can be 
politicised against CSOs working on contested issues. A lack of capacity of 
government agencies concerned with civil society regulation often presents a 
further challenge.
CSO operation: In some countries governments are insisting that CSOs align 
with their priorities and programmes. This undermines the autonomy of 
CSOs. There are also concerns that requirements that CSOs report to state 
agencies can be excessive and politicised, and that processes for the inspection, 
deregistration and dissolution of CSOs may be applied selectively for political 
reasons. CSOs may also have limited capacity to comply with reporting 
requirements. 
Freedom of assembly: Even in contexts where CSOs are supposed to be free to 
hold peaceful assemblies, state agencies and security forces often abuse their 
powers and intervene to prevent or disrupt assemblies. Decisions on whether 
assemblies can proceed may be made on political grounds, and penalties for 
assembly organisers can be excessive. In several countries, recent moves can be 
observed to tighten laws in order to make it harder for citizens to hold public 
protests.
Freedom of expression: Constitutional guarantees on the freedom of expression 
are often undermined, including by recently introduced anti-terrorism laws in 
several countries. Laws on defamation, libel and slander often impose heavy 
sanctions, and may be subject to political manipulation. Non-state actors, 
3including extremist and criminal groups and large corporations, can also 
threaten the freedom of expression, while concentrated media ownership, 
and state intervention in the media, offer further challenges. The internet and 
social media have enhanced civil society’s ability to share its points of view, but 
internet freedom is becoming more contested, and subject to new legislation 
that is often not enabling.
Access to resources: CSOs in many countries see their resourcing environment 
as declining or very difficult, with core resourcing particularly strained. In several 
countries the withdrawal of bilateral donors is causing difficulties, as many 
CSOs are highly dependent on these. At the same time CSOs are concerned 
about the high level of influence of donor policies, which can be disenabling 
and exclusionary. In some countries, governments have introduced restrictions 
on the receipt of international funding. In many contexts, there are also few 
prospects for CSOs to receive domestic state resources, and where these 
are available, they bring concerns about the potential for co-option, and the 
transparency of funding decision-making processes. CSOs report little domestic 
giving from philanthropy and corporate support, and assess that legal and tax 
regimes often do not enable giving.
Civil society-government relations: The EENA research highlights some positive 
examples of cooperation between CSOs and governments, but also many 
instances where relations are more hostile, particularly around contested 
subjects and actions. In most cases, there are few established structures for 
ongoing engagement, and where these exist, they often do not work well. 
Most often relationships are sporadic and ad hoc, with varying patterns of 
engagement across different areas and layers of government. This gives rise to 
concern about the transparency of dialogue, and raises the question of how 
open dialogue opportunities are to a wide range of civil society.
Recommendations
The EENA process demonstrates a willingness by civil society around the world 
to engage actively in improving the conditions for citizens’ participation. It also 
indicates that in very diverse contexts, similar issues are being encountered, 
suggesting potential for enhanced cross-civil society working and the 
international sharing of good practice to overcome common challenges. In the 
light of the EENA analysis, the following recommendations are suggested as the 
basis for future advocacy:
	 Promote, as international best practice, the removal of mandatory 
requirements for CSOs to register in order to carry out their activities. In 
cases where CSOs choose to register in order to obtain legal personality, 
notification regimes rather than approval regimes should be put in 
place.
	 Affirm the right that CSOs should be free to organise meetings and 
events without any need for any prior approval or notification. When 
CSOs organise public protests and demonstrations, notification regimes 
rather than approval regimes should apply, as this enables CSOs to be 
assured that law enforcement services will guarantee public safety.
	 Advocate for the inclusion of civil society practitioners in agencies 
responsible for the registration and regulation of CSOs.
4	 Seek greater accountability over the role of security forces, including in 
the management of assemblies and in the exercise of the freedom of 
expression, and encourage the sharing of good practice in the peaceful 
management of assemblies.
	 Assert the right of CSOs to receive resources, including from 
international sources, as an intrinsic part of the right of association.
	 Support the development of more enabling environments for domestic 
civil society giving, including through more enabling taxation regimes 
and policies to encourage individual and corporate giving.
	 Encourage the adoption of structured, regular, transparent and broad-
based engagement spaces between governments and civil society, 
including regular communication, and document and share learning 
about the impacts achieved for citizens as a result of high quality civil 
society-government engagement.
5This report brings together key findings of Enabling Environment National Assess-
ments (EENA), held in 22 countries between 2013 and 2016. 
The EENA is part of the Civic Space Initiative, implemented by CIVICUS: World 
Alliance for Citizen Participation with the technical support of the Internation-
al Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), in partnership with ARTICLE 19 and the 
World Movement for Democracy, and with the support of the Government of 
Sweden. The aim of the EENA is to enable civil society to assess how conducive 
national conditions are for civil society organisations (CSOs) to exist, function and 
act. More specifically, the EENAs focus on assessing the legal, regulatory and pol-
icy environment for civil society at the national level. 
A structured self-assessment was carried out in each country using a common 
methodology to build up a picture of the legal, regulatory and policy environment 
for civil society. Civil society in each country assessed six compulsory dimensions, 
concerning the ability of CSOs to form and operate, access resources, and exer-
cise the freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression, as well as the relationship 
between CSOs and governments. Research, steered by a national expert advisory 
panel, included desk reviews of laws and regulations affecting CSOs, interviews 
with key stakeholders, focus group discussions and national consultations at the 
end of the research process. Depending on the country context, participants in-
cluded people in key positions in civil society and academia, and where possible, 
government officials.
Countries in which assessments were held are: Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, Honduras, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Mex-
ico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, the Philippines, South Africa, Tajiki-
stan, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. The EENA research therefore covers a variety 
of geographical regions, and a number of contexts in which relations between 
civil society and governments have shifted and CSOs have faced new challenges 
in recent years.
While each country has its own particularities, not least in the make-up of civil 
society and the range of different laws and regulations that affect diverse forms 
of CSOs, this report focuses on points of comparison and intersection. In doing so, 
it seeks to offer a snapshot of the environment for civil society, and the trends in 
civil society’s ability to enjoy its essential rights of association, peaceful assembly 
and expression. A companion paper on civil society responses offers case studies 
of civil society action to address challenges in the enabling environment, with the 
aim of helping to inform civil society follow-up of EENA findings.
Introduction and 
methodology
6Overall the EENA assessments reveal a picture of an environment for civil society 
that is volatile, contested and often under pressure, but also with some optimism 
in some contexts about the potential for progress.
In several countries, including Bolivia, Cambodia, India, Uganda and Zambia, 
CSOs report that civic space is experiencing restrictions. A range of drivers have 
been identified behind these restrictions. For example, in Cambodia, where a re-
strictive Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) was 
enacted in 2015, civil society sees the new law as coming in response to, and 
implicitly acknowledging the success of, the growing abilities of CSOs to mobilise 
citizens. In Uganda, CSO restriction is taking place alongside the concentration 
of presidential power. In Jordan, the government is viewed to be restricting the 
freedom of assembly in particular, and this is understood to be part of a policy of 
suppressing protest potential following the mass mobilisations, often referred to 
as the ‘Arab Spring’, seen in Jordan and elsewhere in the Middle East and North 
Africa in 2010 and 2011. In several contexts, CSOs are seen as a competitor for 
international resources with the government.
Cambodia’s 2015 LANGO is one of a number of recently passed laws discussed 
in this report that constrain civil society. Other examples include Bolivia’s 2013 
law that regulates the granting of legal personality, Uganda’s Non-government 
Organisations (NGO) Act of 2016 and Zambia’s 2009 NGO Act, although the Zam-
bian Act is suspended at the time of writing as a result of civil society advocacy, 
pending further dialogue between government and civil society about possible 
revisions. In other contexts, including Benin, India, Jordan, Nepal and Nigeria, the 
EENA reports indicate that existing laws are being reviewed or possible new laws 
are being discussed that have the potential to introduce new restrictions into the 
environment for civil society. A frequent complaint is that when laws are intro-
duced, this comes without sufficient consultation with civil society. Cambodian 
civil society, for example, made this criticism in relation to the LANGO.
In other contexts, the problem is less the introduction of new laws than the con-
tinued existence of old laws, often from times of colonial rule in countries such as 
Benin, India, Lebanon and Zambia. In some countries, including India and Zambia, 
such laws were introduced with the intention of controlling civil society, when it 
was seen as a challenge to colonial authority. These therefore do not recognise 
the potential for CSOs to contribute to society as partners, or the importance of 
CSO autonomy. Further, as in Cameroon and Zambia, the legal environment may 
be complex and piecemeal, having grown over time, leaving gaps and vast dispar-
ities in the treatment of different forms of CSO that are registered and regulated 
by different laws.
Elsewhere, the challenge is that a country’s constitution and laws are on paper 
permissive of civil society, but laws are poorly implemented in practice, or are 
interpreted selectively and in a politicised manner, in ways that are disenabling. 
This is assessed to be the case in Bolivia and South Africa, for example. In large 
countries, there may particularly be challenges with how laws are implemented 
at the local level: national level laws for civil society may be relatively enabling, 
but there may be an inadequate legal and regulatory environment at the sub-na-
tional level, characterised by gaps, inconsistences and a high level of discretion-
ary power for local officials. This is assessed to be the case in Cambodia, Mexico 
and Mozambique, among other countries. 
overview
7The direction of travel is not entirely towards restriction. The example of Zambia 
shows that civil society can push back against disenabling laws and win new op-
portunities for dialogue. In Mexico the Federal Law on the Promotion of Activities 
Undertaken by Civil Society Organisations, introduced in 2004, is acknowledged 
to have made the environment for civil society more enabling, something that 
has helped to underpin a growth in the numbers and roles of CSOs. It created 
a right for CSOs to participate in public policies and led to the establishment of 
new bodies to coordinate engagement. In Brazil, a new law, the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, passed in 2014 and implemented from 2016, provides 
a framework for ongoing cooperation between the government and CSOs, in-
cluding with CSOs that receive state funding. It is seen as a potential landmark by 
civil society in deepening relations with the government. Tunisian CSOs, having 
played a major role in defending democracy, preventing a slide back into conflict 
and developing the country’s new constitution, are also broadly optimistic about 
the prospects for the enabling environment under the new constitution and the 
2011 Law on Associations.
CSOs in Nepal, on the whole, see the country’s new constitution, passed in 2015, 
as opening up new space and opportunities for civil society, in contrast to the dif-
ficult context of conflict that preceded it. The extensive civil society consultation 
involved in developing the constitution is part of the reason for this. However, a 
draft bill on Association and Organisation under discussion in Nepal threatens to 
introduce new registration and reporting requirements, indicating that continu-
ous engagement is required to uphold the environment for civil society. 
8The first dimension covered by the assessments examines how easy it is for CSOs 
to form, and in particular to register and become ready to begin operations, as 
an essential part of the freedom of association. It therefore particularly explores 
registration mechanisms established and run by governments.
In most contexts there are constitutional guarantees of the freedom of associa-
tion. This usually comes with a statement of limitations that CSOs are not to act 
against the national interest, public order, national unity and public morality, or 
have objectives that impinge on the rights of other citizens or groups. These lim-
itations are, however, not always well-defined. There are sometimes provisions 
to suspend certain constitutional guarantees under states of emergency, as in 
Tunisia.
Constitutional provisions are generally elaborated upon, but can also be under-
cut, by laws that regulate the registration and regulation of CSOs. In the majority 
of countries covered by the EENA research, there is a diversity of laws covering 
different types of CSOs, and often different agencies that govern the registration 
and regulation of CSOs of different types. For example, there are often different 
laws for cooperatives, religious bodies, not-for-profit companies, trade unions, 
youth and sporting associations, and CSOs classified as non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs), a special status in some contexts. This analysis largely covers the 
type of organisation classified variously as an association, society, NGO or volun-
tary organisation, as these make up the majority of CSOs engaged in the pursuit 
of development, democracy and human rights, which CIVICUS’ past research es-
tablishes are those CSOs most likely to experience restriction.
Variations in registration essentials
First it is important to be clear that in several contexts, and in line with interna-
tional best practice, not all CSOs must be registered. In several countries, CSOs 
only need to become registered if they seek to operate at a certain level of for-
mality or take on legal personality. For example, they may need to obtain re-
sources from international donors or domestic government, enter into contracts, 
seek tax benefits or open bank accounts. This is, for example, the case in Bolivia, 
Nigeria, the Philippines and South Africa, all countries that have many small, un-
registered CSOs.
In some contexts, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Mozambique, 
there is a special category of public benefit status that CSOs must register for in 
order to receive public funding. In some countries, such as Benin and Cameroon, 
this is connected to acquiring NGO status, required for access to particular fund-
ing or partnership opportunities, and comes with increased government over-
sight: in Cameroon only CSOs registered as NGOs or public benefit associations 
can legally receive resources in the form of gifts, donations and legacies.
Registration is voluntary in India and South Africa. In comparison, in Uganda, 
even community level CSOs are required to register with their local authority. 
There are different registration regimes for CSOs at different levels in Tajikistan: 
The six dimensions
a. Formation
9smaller, local CSOs need only notify local authorities, while others must register 
at the national level, and some faith-based groups do not need to register. In 
Cameroon, not all CSOs need to be registered, but all CSOs that wish to have legal 
personality must be ‘declared’ at a sub-national government level. The ability 
to operate without registration benefits smaller CSOs in Cameroon, but it also 
makes it hard to identify legitimate CSOs. 
For CSOs that work in contexts where registration is compulsory, or where CSOs 
must register because they need to operate at a formal level, a key distinction is 
between those countries where CSOs may form, gain legal personality and begin 
operations through a process of notifying authorities of their formation - a notifi-
cation regime - and those where permission must be given by the authorities for 
a CSO to form legally - an approval regime. At least five EENA countries - Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lebanon and Tunisia - have a notification or declaration 
regime for ordinary associations.. However, as discussed further below, for some 
countries where a notification regime exists on paper, state officials can act in 
ways that give them the power to approve or refuse a registration.
Some countries offer a notification regime for domestic CSOs but a stronger re-
gime for international CSOs that seek to establish a domestic presence. In Cam-
eroon, Lebanon and Tunisia for example, international CSOs are subject to an 
approval regime, compared to a notification regime for domestic CSOs. In Bolivia 
they must confirm a framework agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and in Uganda international CSOs cannot register unless they have a project 
agreement with at least one government department. The documentation re-
quirements for registering international CSOs are also higher than for domestic 
CSOs in Cambodia.
Regulations on founder members
Often registration requirements establish a minimum number of people who can 
found a CSO, although there is no minimum requirement in Bolivia and Lebanon. 
There is wide disparity between the rules in different countries: a minimum of 
one founder member is required in Mexico and Nigeria, but seven are needed in 
Jordan and Nepal, and also Honduras and India for many CSO types. The require-
ment is particularly high in Mozambique and Zambia, where 10 founder mem-
bers are needed, a stipulation that seems excessive by international comparison. 
Such provisions can work against the formation of smaller CSOs because of the 
practical challenges this creates when multiple people must obtain the correct 
paperwork and clear security checks.
In some contexts, including Nepal and Panama, although with some exceptions in 
the case of Panama, non-nationals are prohibited from being a founder member 
of a CSO. In Jordan, special prime ministerial approval is needed for non-nationals 
to be founder members. In Lebanon, residency requirements mean that members 
of the large Palestinian refugee population are not permitted to establish CSOs, 
contributing to the political exclusion of that part of the population. A majority 
of Philippine residents is needed to found the most common CSO type in the 
Philippines. In other contexts, such as Bolivia, Tajikistan and Tunisia, there is no 
restriction on foreign nationals founding CSOs, providing they are legally resident.
Often regulations set a minimum age for CSO founder members, and this is gen-
erally the national age of majority. People who are not of adult age cannot found 
CSOs in Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tajikistan, for ex-
ample, although young people are allowed to form youth organisations under 
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a separate law in Bolivia. Under 18s are not even allowed to form youth organ-
isations in Mozambique. The challenge this suggests is that young people are 
not being afforded early opportunities to involve themselves in civic participation 
structures.
Another common stipulation is that a founder member must not have a crimi-
nal conviction. This is seen for example in Lebanon, Mozambique, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Zambia. Undischarged bankrupts are similarly barred from founding 
CSOs in Nigeria and Zambia. In Tunisia, people who hold central positions in po-
litical parties may not found CSOs, indicating a desire to separate party politics 
from CSO action. In some cases, the scope for government oversight of founder 
members seems excessive. State officials may reject proposed founder members 
in Zambia, and there are cases where this has happened. There are also examples 
of officials in India questioning the ethnic and caste backgrounds of CSO founder 
members, and of founder members in Lebanon being investigated on anti-terror-
ism pretexts.
Requirements that a CSO must have a minimum capitalisation are however rare. 
These exist under the Civil Code in Cambodia, but awareness of this is assessed 
to be low, and the extent to which this rule is being applied is therefore unclear.
Challenges with registration processes
It is common for different laws to cover different types of CSO, but some regis-
tration and regulation regimes are particularly complex. In India the situation is 
complex because civil society is not well-defined, and many other organisations, 
such as private hospitals and schools, are registered under the same acts that 
CSOs register under. A concern in Colombia, where the law defines some 21 dif-
ferent types of CSO, is that some CSOs are registered under the same regime 
as for-profit organisations. Similarly, registration for a common CSO type in the 
Philippines is handled by the same agency that registers for-profit companies. In 
Zambia, some types of CSOs and political parties register under the same laws. 
The mixture of laws under which CSOs can register is also assessed as highly com-
plex in Cameroon, a country that has two legal systems, one derived from English 
law and one from French. This dual system offers ample scope for discretionary 
interpretation of laws and leaves the legal system confusing and hard to under-
stand for many.
By comparison, the legal environment in Mozambique is seen as under-devel-
oped, in failing to appreciate the diversity of CSOs, leading to a broad brush ap-
proach in which different CSO types are subject to the same requirements. In 
Zambia laws are also seen as too narrow and restrictive in their definitions of civil 
society.
In some contexts, the concern is that registration regimes are scattered and inco-
herent, and that diverse laws and regulations are contradictory. This is assessed 
to be the case in Honduras and Panama, where a fragmented system is seen to 
offer a deterrent against CSOs seeking registration. Brazil also lacks a unified reg-
istry system for CSOs. The state in Zambia may vary the terms and conditions for 
the registration of individual CSOs at the time of registration, meaning that differ-
ent CSOs may be registered under different terms and with different conditions.
There are also situations where there are multiple layers of registration that must 
be navigated. For example, CSOs in the Philippines, once registered, must under-
go a second round of permission-seeking to obtain permits, including with local 
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authorities and the tax authorities, and with specific government departments, 
if they are relevant to their area of work; CSOs must have an additional accred-
itation with the Department of Social Welfare and Development if they engage 
in development and social welfare activities, for example, and the process of ob-
taining this can be lengthy. Multiple bodies are also involved in registration in 
Uganda, and CSOs are compelled to affiliate to a number of local and national 
bodies as part of registration in Nepal. 
Wherever there is complexity, CSOs risk encountering challenges, as complexity 
strains the capacities of CSOs, and implies delays and additional work and costs. 
Across the assessments, it is a frequent criticism that registration processes place 
an undue burden on CSOs. Complex procedures also offer more scope for appli-
cations to be refused and for officials to exercise personal discretion.
Generally, paperwork that must be submitted as part of a registration application 
includes a CSO’s by-laws, its mission and aims, a list of founder members, the 
minutes of its constitutive assembly and a work plan. In India, the number of 
documents that must be submitted is assessed to be high, and documentation 
requirements are also rated as burdensome in Honduras, Nepal and Uganda. In 
Cameroon, there is regional variation, and sometimes more documents are re-
quested than the law stipulates.
In Honduras all 10 documents that CSOs supply must be legally authenticated, 
which adds to costs and acts as a barrier against smaller CSOs. Similarly, in Pan-
ama, the requirement to file application documentation through a lawyer offers 
an obstacle. Legal costs are also noted as a challenge in Jordan and Mexico. In 
Nigeria, as the registration process is complex and vulnerable to corruption, CSOs 
assess that legal assistance is essential in making an application. Legal help is also 
often required to understand registration processes in Brazil. Fortunately, some 
supportive law firms in Brazil offer free legal aid to CSOs. There are also some 
arrangements between sub-national governments and legal firms in Mexico to 
make discounted legal support available.
A related and frequently cited challenge is lack of information or poor quality 
information on registration processes. An absence of information is cited as a 
problem in some parts of India, and information is assessed to be confusing in 
South Africa. In Mexico it is reported that many CSOs struggle to develop their by-
laws, but lack awareness of model by-laws available online that they could adapt. 
At the local level in Mozambique it is hard for CSOs to access registration docu-
ments, and local officials may offer an obstacle by not facilitating access to this in-
formation. Bolivian officials are also assessed to offer little useful advice to CSOs 
applying for registration, and officials in Mexico to offer inadequate support.
Sometimes the language that information is supplied in offers an obstacle. In 
Burkina Faso, while registration processes are assessed to be largely open and 
smooth, language and literacy are a challenge, with procedures on registration 
not accessible to many citizens because they are only available in French. Similar 
challenges with lack of local language translation are seen in India and Uganda. 
Terminology is an issue in Cambodia. The language of the Civil Code is not easy to 
understand, and while its provisions on civil society are important for CSOs, they 
form part of a much larger text that does not relate to civil society, which makes 
it hard to engage with. Further, in Cambodia, inconsistent use of terminology by 
state officials adds to complexity.
Poor information and the need for high levels of documentation lead to poor 
quality applications. For example, because of the lack of clear guidance on the 
application process in Panama, documents are often returned to CSOs for correc-
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tions. Similarly, in India, requests for more information can delay the processing 
of applications. In South Africa, incomplete applications must be started afresh. 
It is reported that almost 95 per cent of applications made in Tunisia do not meet 
the documentation requirements, and the law does not establish the procedures 
to be followed in such cases. 
Scanty support and poor information result in part because the state bodies that 
handle CSO registration and regulation often lack capacity. This is identified as a 
challenge in Cameroon, Honduras, Lebanon, Nepal, the Philippines, South Africa 
and Uganda, for example, and in Bolivia, where poor organisation is seen as go-
ing hand in hand with low official capacity. Lack of capacity means that in some 
countries, including in Benin and Tunisia, the authorities cannot even estimate 
how many CSOs exist. CSOs in Mozambique report that there is an absence of 
a government body with a clear mandate for working with CSOs. In almost all 
cases, there is a lack of representation by people from and with expertise in civil 
society in government bodies that handle CSO registration and regulation.
In Tunisia CSO registration is handled by a new body, the Directorate of Associa-
tions, established in 2012, reflecting a shift in how the state views CSOs since the 
2011 revolution. A move from an approval regime to a notification regime that 
came after the revolution led to a large increase in registrations, but the Direc-
torate is assessed to lack resources, staff and training. This has led to challenges 
when CSOs do not receive an acknowledgement of receipt of their registration, 
which can hinder their ability to operate. Lack of capacity also hampers the grant-
ing of NGO status for CSOs that apply for this in Cameroon. NGO status is granted 
by a decision of the NGO Commission, but this meets only sporadically, largely 
due to a lack of resources, and rarely grants NGO status. In Nigeria, it is assessed 
that because staff of the registration body do not always understand the purpose 
of some CSOs, they ask for more information, which causes delays in registration. 
In comparison, the relevant department in Burkina Faso is assessed to be ade-
quately staffed, with a good level of expertise. 
Along with lack of capacity in registration bodies there are also issues of political 
obstruction and corruption. Local officials can create obstacles in India, and offi-
cials in Uganda are seen to hold excessive power over small, local CSOs. There are 
cases of officials exceeding their authority in Tunisia, and regarding registration 
as dependent on their approval under what is supposed to be a notification re-
gime. Tunisian officials may ask CSOs to modify their aims or statutes as part of 
the registration process. In the face of this, some CSOs withdraw. There can also 
be deliberate delays and alterations in publishing notices of registrations in the 
official gazette. This was not anticipated by the law, and so the law has no provi-
sions to challenge it. 
In Mozambique officials are assessed to have wide discretion in exercising their 
powers. At the local level, there are some officials that insist that CSOs periodical-
ly renew their registrations, even though this is not required by law. In Honduras, 
officials have been known to request amendments to by-laws, such as term limits 
for CSO governance bodies, before granting registration, even though there is no 
provision in the law for them to do so. Broad, vague provisions that leave con-
siderable discretionary powers for ministers and officials are also cited as a chal-
lenge in Cameroon and under the LANGO in Cambodia and NGO Act in Zambia: 
in Cambodia, the new law has made registration requirements highly complex, 
and local and national government officials are given considerable powers, while 
there is scope for wide ministerial discretion in Zambia. Discretionary powers of 
officials are also assessed to be high in Jordan.
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Public benefit status, without which CSOs in Cameroon cannot receive funding, is 
granted by presidential decree, but the procedures of application are opaque, not 
defined by any laws and subject to a high level of official discretion. It is reported 
that since 1990, not many CSOs have been granted public benefit status. Fortu-
nately, at the administrative level, there is some tolerance that enables CSOs to 
receive funding without having this status. 
Corruption is acknowledged in several of the assessments. Favouritism and cor-
ruption among officials is, for example, cited as a challenge in Cameroon and Ne-
pal, while in Honduras, officials may be paid a bribe to ensure rapid processing of 
an application. In Cambodia as well, bribes often need to be paid to officials to re-
ceive the correct stamps on documents, at a cost of around US$300. Some CSOs 
accordingly work with agents who charge a fee to navigate this process. Failing to 
pay such unofficial fees can lead to officials being deliberately obstructive. Much 
may also depend in Cambodia on personal relations with the relevant officials. 
There may be a similar need to pay bribes in India, and sometimes officials agree 
to write CSOs’ registrations applications in return for payment.
Beyond challenges at the level of individual officials, there are further obstacles 
that governments may impose. In Uganda the requirement that applications 
must include a letter of recommendation from a government body offers broad 
scope for state interference. This has led to cases of government officials asking 
CSOs to change their vision, mission and objectives, something also observed in 
Cambodia. There is also a requirement under the NGO Act in Zambia for a rec-
ommendation letter from a government agency, which before the Act was sus-
pended, offered the state a veto on registration: a recommendation letter need 
not be granted, and could be considered unlikely for a CSO that proposed to hold 
the government to account. In Nepal, a recommendation from a District Admin-
istration Office may be required, depending on the objectives of a CSO, but this 
is left undefined.
The body that regulates CSOs in Nigeria specifies the aims that it is acceptable for 
a CSO seeking registration to pursue. In less democratic times applications were 
rejected for focusing on human rights and democracy, and even now, the list of 
what is deemed acceptable is narrow: for example, the promotion of democracy 
or human rights is not stated as an acceptable aim of a CSO seeking registration. 
Similarly, regulations in Uganda do not recognise advocacy as a legitimate CSO 
aim. Bolivian law recognises CSOs as bodies engaged in development or charita-
ble activities, implying some scope for the government to limit the objectives of 
CSOs. Very few work areas are allowed for CSOs that seek to register as not-for-
profit companies in Jordan. 
Aside from what is set out in laws and regulations, political factors can obstruct 
registration. For example, Lebanon is assessed to have a relatively liberal registra-
tion regime, but it can become politicised at times of particular political contesta-
tion. In some parts of India, there is a sense that registration has become open to 
more scrutiny as relations between CSOs and government have worsened.
As an example of how political obstructions can be mounted to block CSOs work-
ing on contested issues, LGBTI CSOs struggle to obtain registration in several coun-
tries. In Panama one LGBTI CSO waited nine years and had to go to the Supreme 
Court before registration was granted. In Mozambique, the LGBTI CSO Lambda 
has been trying to get its application for registration accepted since 2007. Since 
2014, the registration of LGBTI CSOs has been prohibited in Nigeria. In Lebanon 
LGBTI CSOs have been assumed to be illegal, although a 2014 court decision may 
open up the way to LGBTI CSOs gaining legal recognition.
14
A further obstacle that can make registration harder, slower and more expensive 
comes from the emphasis in some contexts on concentrating registration in cap-
ital cities. In Mexico it is assessed that registration is harder for rural CSOs com-
pared to urban CSOs, and in Mozambique and Panama registration is assessed 
to be particularly difficult for grassroots CSOs. Registration processes are highly 
centralised in Honduras, Panama and Tunisia. The need to deposit a certificate 
of legal personality in the Public Registry in Panama entails a visit to the capital. 
There is also a need to file documents by hand in the Philippines, but there are 
only a limited number of field offices in which this can be done. Most contexts do 
not have electronic registration systems, and there are often challenges reported 
in the functioning of these where they exist. For example, the inefficiency of the 
online submission process in South Africa leads to CSOs needing to visit the cap-
ital. These challenges impose additional costs and travel burdens that deter rural 
and smaller CSOs in particular.
There are also examples of decentralised regimes, where registration is han-
dled by officials based outside capitals. These can help smaller and rural CSOs, 
although the caveat should be stated that localised processes can play to the 
challenges of local variation in rules and corruption noted above. Decentralised 
registration processes are noted in Cameroon, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nepal, Ni-
geria and Tajikistan, for example. In India and Mexico, both federal states, there 
are laws and processes at the sub-national state level, leading to a patchwork of 
varying requirements. A regressive step in this regard was taken in Bolivia, where 
previously there was some decentralisation of bodies that could grant legal status 
to CSOs. Under the constitution passed in 2009, central government was given 
exclusive authority for CSOs that operate in more than one sub-national district. 
There are other ways in which smaller and rural CSOs may find it difficult to nav-
igate registration processes. For example, in Mozambique, rural CSO founders 
may struggle to obtain access to certification of their lack of criminal record, an 
essential part of registration. Similar issues are experienced in Jordan and Zam-
bia.
In general, the high costs of registration are seen to be a barrier in Bolivia, Hon-
duras, Mozambique, Panama and Zambia, particularly for smaller or rural CSOs. 
Costs for registering CSO umbrella organisations are assessed as particularly high 
in Bolivia. In some parts of India, costs are seen to have increased a great deal in 
recent years. Because of the costs, it is reported that some CSOs in Mozambique 
that begin registration processes do not complete them. In comparison, registra-
tion is assessed to be cheap in Burkina Faso, and costs are reported to be minimal 
in Tunisia. Registration of CSOs as non-profit organisations is free in South Africa. 
There are two registration regimes depending on CSO type in Colombia, one of 
which is free, but the other of which carries considerable costs.
As a result of these various challenges, it can take a long time for a registration 
decision to be made. Long delays are noted in India and South Africa, and stat-
ed time limits are not respected in Cameroon and Mozambique. A challenge in 
Cameroon is that it is hard for a CSO seeking registration to obtain information 
on the progress of its application. The time to issue a receipt of registration can 
vary in Lebanon, and there is no fixed time for registration to be concluded in Ni-
geria or Uganda. Different CSOs experience wide variation in the time it takes in 
Panama, with the implication that applications from CSOs that are seen to pose 
challenging questions are processed slowly, while applications from CSOs seen as 
well-connected to the government or supportive of it are processed rapidly. The 
challenges that CSOs experience in registration are contrasted with the relative 
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ease in registering a for-profit company in Panama and Nepal. In comparison, the 
process of issuing registrations is assessed to be fast in Burkina Faso. As well as 
being frustrating and preventing CSOs from beginning their activities, delays can 
block a CSO from receiving funding, as registration is often prerequisite.
Registration refusals, renewals and appeals
There are some contexts where refusal of a registration is rare. For example, the 
Mexico assessment could not identify any cases of registration being rejected. 
However, there are others where refusal is more common, such as Jordan, where 
permission is reported as frequently being refused. In particular, applications to 
register trade unions are routinely refused in Jordan, leaving independent trade 
unions operating in a legal vacuum where they are vulnerable to restriction. This 
is seen to be consistent with a general atmosphere of government suspicion to-
wards CSOs in Jordan.
It is common for there to be some kind of appeal procedure for when registration 
applications are refused. In South Africa, the reasons behind a refusal must be 
given, and there is a clear appeal process. This is also considered to be the case in 
Tajikistan. However, there are cases when reasons for refusal are not given, which 
makes it hard to mount an appeal. In Jordan no reason need be given, and there 
are no available criteria on how decisions are made in Uganda. It is also hard to 
appeal when state officials have wide discretionary powers, as is the case in Cam-
bodia, Honduras and Panama. The Commission that decides on registration ap-
plications in Nigeria also has considerable discretion to refuse an application, and 
the criteria for doing so are not clear. A further concern in Bolivia, Cameroon and 
Nigeria is that there is a lack of clarity and information about appeal procedures. 
There is no apparent mechanism for appeals in Cambodia, and no examples of 
appeals being mounted could be given in the assessment.
Once registered, it is relatively rare that CSOs must periodically renew their reg-
istrations. No requirement to renew registration periodically is reported in Brazil, 
Cambodia, Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, South Africa, Tajikistan and Tunisia, 
among others. However, Zambia’s NGO Act mandates re-registration every five 
years. According to regulations in Nepal, CSOs registered under one particular 
act, the Association Registration Regulation of 1977, must renew registration an-
nually, which imposes an ongoing burden on CSOs. There are some variations at 
the sub-national government level about the need for periodic re-registration in 
India. In Cambodia international CSOs need to renew a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) with the government every three years. Renewals tend to be 
a protracted process in Uganda, and it is assessed that there is favouritism and 
politicisation exercised in the renewal of registrations in Bolivia. 
Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that while constitutions generally claim to uphold the 
freedom of association, regulations and processes on registration fall far short of 
the realisation of this. It is rare that CSOs are free to form and function without 
the need to notify or seek approval from state agencies. In too many contexts 
approval regimes are in place, and there are some notification regimes that op-
erate more in the manner of approval regimes, given the obstacles CSOs can en-
counter. Registration processes are often complex, bureaucratic and sometimes 
incoherent. Provisions can be vague and give excessive scope for official discre-
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tion, making the outcomes of applications unpredictable. CSOs often find them 
to be slow, expensive and labour intensive, and government agencies often lack 
capacity, or processes give scope for corruption and politicisation. Registration 
processes count against smaller and rural CSOs, including for reasons of costs, 
isolation from capitals and the power vested in local officials. In some contexts, 
it is not unusual for applications to be turned down, and appeal processes are 
sometimes lacking.
Suggested focal points for future advocacy on the basis of this analysis could be to 
urge a greater adoption of international best practice, in which CSOs neither need 
to notify or seek approval from state authorities when they form; to move from 
approval regimes to notification regimes for CSOs that seek legal personality; and 
to seek to bring civil society representation and expertise into registration bodies.
Once any registration hurdles are overcome, CSOs should be free to operate au-
tonomously, guided by their mission and mandates and responsive to the needs 
of their constituencies. However, this is often not the case. This section examines 
three key issues relating to the freedom of association: the extent to which CSOs 
are free to pursue their aims independently of governments; the degree of gov-
ernment oversight of CSOs; and the level of government sanctions against CSOs 
for non-compliance. 
The operation of CSOs is an area where new legislation currently in development 
threatens to introduce fresh restrictions in several countries. The Proposed Multi-
State Society Registration law in India will increase government powers to bar 
CSOs from operation pending registration, and give the government new powers 
to investigate and dissolve a CSO, among other provisions. Laws are also being 
reviewed in Jordan, in a move that could see new limitations posed on the num-
ber of projects CSOs can run, among other restrictions, while the draft bill on 
Association and Organisation under discussion in Nepal would increase reporting 
requirements.
Alignment
In several contexts, there is some level of expectation that CSOs should align with 
plans and priorities set by the government. In Bolivia, under the 2013 law on legal 
personality, CSOs are expected to align with the government’s economic and so-
cial development plans, and amend their statutes to reflect this. Failure to do so 
gives grounds for CSOs to be deregistered and dissolved. This clearly compromis-
es the autonomy of CSO operations, and increases the potential threat they face. 
The requirement to align is more tightly stated still for international CSOs with a 
presence in Bolivia. Elsewhere, expectations of alignment are less strongly stated, 
but nevertheless can be present. For example, there is no legal requirement for 
CSOs to align with the government in Mozambique, but in some cases there may 
be heavy expectation among government officials that they do so.
In Nepal it is stated that CSOs should give priority to projects that match the pri-
orities of their local government bodies. Many CSOs operating at the local level 
in Uganda are required to sign MOUs with local authorities, although in reality 
B. operation
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this is not always enforced. CSOs that operate in more than one locality may be 
required to make a multiplicity of such agreements, which can add to the admin-
istrative burden for CSOs. The NGO Act in Zambia, before its suspension, required 
CSOs registered under it to align with government programmes, and gave the 
state the power to approve a CSO’s activities and geographical areas of focus, 
and reject these if deemed not to be in the public interest, a term left undefined.
While there is no requirement to align with government priorities in Burkina Faso 
and Nigeria, alignment often occurs as a condition of funding from international 
donors. Elsewhere, as in Mexico, alignment needs to be demonstrated to benefit 
from tax advantages.
The trend seems to be towards a requirement for closer alignment. Two bills un-
der discussion in Nigeria - the Foreign Contribution and NGO Regulatory Agen-
cy Bills - would see CSOs required to align with government plans and obtain 
approval from the government before implementing projects, although to date 
there has been little progress on these. A proposed law in Uganda, the NGO 
Amendment Bill, would extend government approval over CSO activities, use of 
resources and staffing.
As well as such stipulations, governments in some contexts have the power to 
block CSO activities pre-emptively. For example, there are strict rules on the need 
to give advance notice of activities in Uganda, and there are examples in Mozam-
bique of CSO activities being blocked in such areas as monitoring natural resource 
management and defending the rights of communities. In Nepal, CSOs must ob-
tain prior permission if they want to extend their work into other districts.
Reporting and oversight
A distinction can be made between countries in which CSOs must report regularly 
to the government, and those in which there is no such requirement.
There is a stipulation for annual reporting in Nigeria, the Philippines and Zam-
bia. In Nepal, there must be annual reporting to local government bodies, with 
failure to report offering grounds for non-renewal of registration. Annual gov-
ernment inspections and audits exist in Panama. CSOs registered as non-profit 
organisations in South Africa must submit annual reports and audited financial 
statements, and CSOs registered as public associations in Tajikistan must make 
annual reports. CSOs registered as NGOs must provide annual audited reports in 
Cameroon. Annual reporting is also required for CSOs registered as foundations 
in Brazil, but less stringent reporting requirements apply for other forms of CSOs. 
In Mexico, CSOs registered with the Federal Registry - which is not mandatory 
- must submit an annual report, and CSOs registered as private assistance insti-
tutions must periodically report to local government bodies, but other CSO types 
do not need to report.
CSOs must report every three years in Bolivia, accompanied by a plan for the next 
three years. In addition, international CSOs registered in Bolivia are assessed on 
their compliance with the framework agreement for cooperation with the gov-
ernment. 
It is often a requirement, for example in Brazil, India, Mexico and Nigeria, that 
CSOs file an annual tax return, and in India, CSOs must submit audited accounts 
alongside this. Tunisian CSOs, if they have an income above a certain threshold, 
must appoint an auditor and publish financial statements. CSOs in Panama are 
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also required to publish financial information on a website, which is assessed to 
impose an additional cost on smaller CSOs. In Lebanon the Ministry of Finance 
reviews CSOs’ annual budgets to check if they qualify for tax exemptions. 
Under anti-money laundering rules, Nigerian CSOs must report any receipt of 
funds over US$1,000, and Honduran CSOs donations above US$2,000. Tunisian 
CSOs must notify the government of any funds that come from international 
sources. CSOs that receive tax deductible donations must report their donations 
and payments to the Ministry of Economy and Finance in Panama. There are sim-
ilar requirements to report donations and expenditure annually in Bolivia and 
Mexico.
In Nigeria, a recent trend has been for the revenue service and banks to request 
the tax certificates of CSO trustees. The Anti-Corruption Law in Cambodia also 
commands CSO leaders to disclose their assets, although this has not yet been 
put into action.
There are provisions for random inspections of CSOs in Honduras, while in Leba-
non, the state can inspect CSOs if it believes they are in breach of rules. Similarly, 
Nigerian CSOs may be subject to audits and inspections if the authorities believe 
they are not acting consistent with their stated purpose. Provisions for inspec-
tions exist in Zambia, but instances are rare because of low staff capacities in the 
relevant agencies. Inspections of CSOs are also reported to be rare in Tajikistan.
There are also often reporting conditions around CSO meetings, which affect the 
freedom of assembly as well as the freedom of association. Copies of decisions 
made at CSO general meetings in Jordan must be sent to the government within 
two weeks. In Nigeria, minutes of CSO general meetings must be sent to the gov-
ernment. In Mexico these must also be legally certified before being shared with 
the authorities. 
It is common that CSOs need to inform the authorities of changes in their name, 
statutes or headquarters. Government approval is needed for changes of by-laws 
in Jordan.
Challenges with reporting and oversight
It is harder and more time-consuming for CSO to comply with reporting and over-
sight requirements when these are discretionary, arbitrary and unpredictable. 
For example, challenges come in South Africa because of arbitrary changes to the 
reporting system, and a lack of communication of these changes. In Colombia, 
oversight is delegated to a wide range of national and sub-national bodies, lead-
ing to a lack of a standardised approach, as well as skills gaps. 
There are broader issues of reporting and supervision processes being politicised. 
There is, for example, assessed to be a generally light oversight regime in Pan-
ama, but it can be politicised: supervision is increased when a CSO is seen as 
being at odds with the government. Politicisation in Panama also means that in-
formation gathered through reporting procedures may be deployed for political 
purposes, to form the basis of attacks on CSOs. There is a similar concern in India 
that, while there is little oversight of CSOs in general, those that are working on 
rights and advocacy, or working in areas where there is extremism, are singled 
out for oversight. Excessive oversight can include informal requests for frequent 
reports. Supervision of CSOs is seen to increase during times of political pressure 
in Mozambique, and there is a sense in Bolivia that oversight is increasing, partic-
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ularly for CSOs that take stances on issues with which the government disagrees. 
The NGO Board in Uganda is also assessed to have very broad oversight powers. 
Inconsistency in the application of laws on oversight is noted in Cambodia, which 
brings unpredictability and arbitrariness, particularly in the ways in which laws 
are interpreted at local levels. Local officials may particularly scrutinise human 
rights CSOs, and there are instances of officials ordering CSOs to halt activities. 
There is also varying application of the provision that CSOs should inform local 
authorities if they are working in a province other than that in which they are reg-
istered, ranging from neglect of this provision to some local authorities interpret-
ing it as giving them prior approval power over activities. There is wide variation 
between different areas. Similarly, while reporting is not required under the law 
in Mozambique, in spite of this, some local officials insist on regular reports and 
supervision. There are also cases when local officials, on the basis that they do 
not feel sufficiently informed, have asked CSOs to pause activities.
Compliance of CSOs
In some cases, the ability or failure of CSOs to comply with reporting and over-
sight requirements raises concerns.
There is assessed to be a lack of widespread information on reporting require-
ments in Cambodia: a guidebook on reporting is not widely circulated or known. 
This means that CSOs often do not understand the regulatory framework, and 
so CSO reporting often does not occur. Similarly, compliance capacity by CSOs 
is identified as an issue in Tajikistan, where CSOs find it hard to keep on top of 
the paperwork and largely lack legal capacity, and Cameroon, where CSOs may 
lack knowledge of regulatory rules. CSOs in Honduras may also struggle with the 
need to travel to the capital to submit annual reports, particularly as they often 
have their paperwork queried following its delivery. Inaccessibility of offices in 
the Philippines makes it hard for CSOs to report, as almost all reporting must be 
done physically. It is also difficult for smaller CSOs in the Philippines to prepare re-
porting documentation. Reporting requirements are assessed to be expensive in 
Panama and Zambia, where audit fees in particular are high, and there is assessed 
to be duplication in reporting and oversight procedures in Honduras.
There are concerns in several contexts, including Colombia, Lebanon and the Phil-
ippines, that annual reports are being submitted to the government, but these 
are not being read and reviewed: that the exercise is a formality. This means that 
the work of CSOs may go unrecognised and CSO lose the potential to use report-
ing as a starting point to influence the government. 
In the Philippines, this lack of response has led to many CSOs not meeting re-
porting requirements. There is also some failure of CSOs to submit reports as 
required in Uganda, which raises the concern that this can leave CSOs vulnerable 
to subsequent intervention. Low capacity of CSOs in Zambia causes them to miss 
reporting deadlines as well.
A concern in Lebanon is that lenient oversight may enable fraudulent and ex-
tremist bodies to masquerade as CSOs, and CSOs to practise corruption. A light 
oversight regime is seen here to result from government weaknesses, and to be 
highly dependent on the personality of the relevant minister, rather than stem 
from trust in CSOs. 
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In India there is concern that the legal framework for CSOs registered as trusts is 
inadequate: non-CSOs operate as trusts and some of them are clearly oriented 
around profit. This can cause the legitimacy of genuine CSOs to be questioned. 
As in Lebanon, genuine CSOs would prefer a predictable, rules-based system that 
enables them to demonstrate their legitimacy.
A related concern in Tunisia is whether current structures, such as audit struc-
tures, have the capacity to cope with a growth in CSO numbers and influx of 
resources for civil society that have followed the 2011 revolution. This raises the 
fear in Tunisia that poor state oversight capacities allow fraudulent CSOs to pros-
per. It is felt that there is a need for new monitoring structures and harmonised 
reporting and accounting methods that are efficient, but that do not interfere 
excessively in the legitimate work of civil society.
Penalties, deregistration and dissolution
In most contexts there are systems where CSOs can be penalised for falling foul 
of regulations. In general, countries have an ascending scale of fines, suspension, 
deregistration and dissolution, with some level of judicial oversight and some 
means of appeal, which offer a level of protection for CSOs. Dissolution, as the 
final sanction, can generally be made on such grounds as violation of laws, threat 
to peace, security or public safety, or long-term lack of activity. There are how-
ever concerns in several contexts about broad provisions for sanctions and the 
politicisation of these.
In Bolivia, divergence from activities consistent with a CSOs’ aims is established 
as offering grounds for dissolution, something that causes concern, given the 
breadth of this provision, and the fact that it sits at odds with the dynamic and 
evolutionary nature of civil society. There is also concern that a current climate of 
worsening relations could see forced dissolutions increase, given the leeway for 
government action that the law provides. Some CSOs in Burkina Faso have also 
been threatened with withdrawal of tax benefits; significantly, these were CSOs 
that were seen to be causing difficulties for the government.
In Panama, the law also offers broad grounds for dissolution. In practice, the state 
in Panama is not pursuing the dissolution of CSOs, but the law remains a potential 
future threat. Some illegal dissolution of CSOs occurred in Lebanon during past 
times of political contestation, but dissolution is now rare. The state also has wide 
powers to suspend and dissolve CSOs in Cameroon.
In Jordan, the government may dissolve a CSO’s board and appoint a new one - 
and there are several instances of this happening - as well as impose fines and 
dissolve CSOs. A further concern is the lack of judicial oversight over these provi-
sions. There is also an absence of mechanisms for appeal against deregistration, 
suspension or dissolution in Cambodia, and vague grounds for the termination of 
the activities of international CSOs. The grounds available for de-registration are 
considered broad in Zambia, and there is no guarantee that an appeal will receive 
a hearing.
There are also concerns about other excessive forms of sanction. Ugandan CSOs 
are held responsible for any acts of their employees or members, and there are 
criminal sanctions for non-compliance with regulations in Cambodia and Zambia. 
In Zambia, the vulnerability of CSO officials to criminal sanctions is contrasted 
with the protection that laws offer officials, which perpetuates an unequal rela-
tionship. There is limited awareness among CSOs in Honduras of the potential for 
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the government to impose sanctions, including fines, suspension and dissolution, 
and of the wide discretionary powers that officials have to apply these.
In Tunisia, a number of organisations have been closed on the basis that they 
are believed to support terrorism. They have, however, been shut down for for-
mal violations of the law, such as failure to comply with reporting requirements, 
which would not normally be expected to give grounds for dissolution. While it 
is important to distinguish legitimate CSOs from fake ones that act as fronts for 
terrorism, scrutiny will be needed to ensure that such breaches of established 
dissolution procedures do not become more widespread. In Zambia, for example, 
CSOs have been de-registered as threats to state security when many suspect the 
real reason was that they had taken positions contrary to those of the govern-
ment. The Law Against Terrorist Financing in Honduras is another measure that 
contains strong provisions to dissolve CSOs that offer potential for misuse.
Conclusion
In summary, laws on operation often undermine the freedom of association. 
There is civil society concern about provisions in some contexts that CSOs 
should align with government priorities and programmes, and some apparent 
movement towards mandating closer alignment. There are also challenges with 
oversight regimes, including imposed and excessive reporting requirements and 
politicised use of reporting processes, and with the compliance capacity of CSOs 
and associated poor quality of reporting. Finally, sanctions for non-compliance 
may be excessive, broad and applied for political reasons. Oversight is exercised 
most strongly against CSOs that engage in advocacy and accountability activities, 
and CSOs that seek human rights, good governance and democracy. 
Suggested focal points for future advocacy could be on restating the autonomous 
role and contribution of civil society, and replacing compulsory reporting regimes 
with more constructive, meaningful and equal dialogues between CSOs and gov-
ernments.
Along with the freedom of association, most countries have constitutions that 
uphold the right to peaceful assembly. As with the freedom of association, con-
stitutions often introduce limitations, typically relating to state security, public 
order and morality. And again, there are often significant gaps between the con-
stitutional and legal position and the experience in practice.
In terms of laws, the key distinction is between countries in which CSOs must 
obtain prior permission to hold a public gathering, and those in which they must 
only notify the authorities that an assembly will take place.
Countries in which there is a notification regime include Burkina Faso, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Panama and South Africa. These have varying periods for notification 
of local authorities or police: seven days in advance in South Africa, three days 
in Burkina Faso, two days in Jordan and Lebanon, and one day in Panama. Noti-
fications generally must include details of the date, timing, location, route (for 
marches), content and organisers of an event. In Nepal, spontaneous assemblies 
c. Freedom of assembly
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are allowed without notification, and the culture towards demonstrations and 
protests is seen by civil society as relatively permissive. 
Compared to this, CSOs in Tajikistan must seek approval from local authorities, 
which can change the dates, timing and location of events. In Uganda approv-
al must be sought from the police. Permits are also required in Honduras. The 
approval regime is assessed to be quite difficult in India, with permission com-
monly required to hold events, including public meetings, rallies, demonstrations 
and international civil society meetings. Magistrates are permitted to prohibit 
assemblies of over 10 people, and there are many instances of permission being 
refused, often on grounds of potential breach of the peace. Further in India, re-
quirements to inform authorities about meetings that include the public, state 
officials or international participants are sometimes seen as bringing excessive 
oversight, to the extent that it is reported that it is now difficult to organise in-
ternational assemblies. It can also be hard to obtain permission in Tunisia, but 
many unauthorised assemblies take place regardless, albeit sometimes attracting 
police attention.
Sometimes government officials can insist that they are invited to CSO meetings, 
which may impose a chilling effect on debate. In Jordan, CSOs registered as asso-
ciations must inform authorities two weeks in advance of the dates of their gen-
eral meetings and allow state representatives to attend. In Tajikistan, government 
officials are allowed to attend any public event convened by CSOs registered as 
public associations.
In several contexts, the law on freedom of assembly has been fluid in recent years, 
with recent changes and challenges. A proposed law currently under discussion 
in Colombia, the Bill to amend the Code of Police, would increase restrictions: 
holders of demonstrations would have to apply to their local mayor five days in 
advance, who could refuse the application within three days. The police would be 
given broad powers to refuse or break up an assembly, and to change its date and 
location. In Tunisia, given the changes since the revolution, there is now a lack of 
fit between the provisions of the new constitution, which explicitly recognise the 
need to protect the freedom of assembly, and laws that pre-date it, which are 
highly restrictive. While a new bill has been developed that would bring laws on 
assembly more closely into line with international standards, its adoption has not 
been made a priority. This leaves civil society in an uncertain position.
More positively, under the Public Order Act in Nigeria a permit was needed to 
hold an assembly, but this was challenged through the courts and ruled as uncon-
stitutional in 2007. Following this, assembly organisers may notify the authorities 
only if they seek police protection; however, the power of local authorities to 
prescribe the route and timing of a demonstration remains as part of the law.
Some recently introduced restrictions can be seen to have the aim of making it 
harder to organise protests that entail the occupation of public spaces, a success-
ful protest tactic that has been seen in many parts of the world in recent years. 
In Colombia, demonstrations to block roads or access to infrastructure are pro-
hibited; in Tajikistan, a law on meetings, rallies, demonstrations and street pro-
cessions passed in 2014 prohibits the wearing of masks, the creation of obstacles 
and traffic blocks, and the setting up of temporary structures. The Tajikistan law 
further sets broad and vague restrictions on what may be said on protest banners 
and posters. There are also prohibitions on obstructing streets in Nepal and Pana-
ma. However, in Mexico, where there is a robust protest culture in Mexico City in 
particular, regulations to prevent the blocking of streets are not applied.
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The location of assemblies is often a particular concern of laws and regulations. 
Permits are required in the Philippines, but only if the assembly is held in a pub-
lic place, and the law also designates ‘freedom parks’ in which assemblies may 
be held freely. In both Burkina Faso and Lebanon, there are designated areas in 
which protests are prohibited, such as the area around the parliament and pres-
idential palace in Lebanon. CSOs may respond to tight regulations by shifting the 
locations of assemblies: civil society meetings in Jordan and Zambia often take 
place in private spaces to avoid police attention.
While the divide between notification regimes and approval regimes seems clear, 
in practice in some contexts, state agencies are excessively interventionist and 
move to prevent assemblies once notified of them. Some local authorities in 
South Africa have turned what it supposed to be a notification regime into an 
approval regime: they have been known to request additional documentation 
beyond that which the law requires. These have the effect of making it harder to 
organise a legal protest, and make it more likely that protests will be held without 
authorisation, which then have a higher chance of being met with violence. In 
Zambia, the police may impose conditions on the date, time, place, duration and 
manner of assembly. If they deem these conditions not to have been met, they 
may halt the assembly, in effect giving the police a veto. In Burkina Faso, the au-
thorities may issue additional regulations that prevent the holding of assemblies, 
and examples of the closure of meeting venues have been observed. The climate 
is also assessed to be one of creeping restriction in Cameroon.
In Cambodia, organisers of an assembly must notify local authorities at least five 
days in advance, but in practice this functions as a process of authorisation, as 
permission is sometimes refused. Sometimes CSOs in Cambodia and South Africa 
believe the grounds given for refusal of permission are spurious, with the real 
motive being the prevention of the voicing of dissent.
The police are criticised for having wide powers to break up assemblies in Hondu-
ras, Jordan and Tajikistan. In some contexts, including South Africa and Zambia, 
it is assessed that security forces sometimes exceed their mandates, and assume 
the power to prevent or suppress public meetings. Despite the formal absence 
of an approval regime in Mozambique, many peaceful demonstrations have been 
blocked or violently broken up. In Uganda there is a growing problem of police 
interference and unlawful obstruction of gatherings, with participants and organ-
isers arrested and detained. Cambodian police forces can also be highly inter-
ventionist, including in disputing the size, location and routes of demonstrations.
Excessive security force intervention goes hand in hand with violence. The assess-
ments report violence between security forces and protestors in Bolivia, Brazil, 
Lebanon, South Africa and Tunisia, and against unauthorised events in Jordan and 
Mozambique. In some parts of Mexico, the police are allowed to use firearms to 
disperse demonstrations, and in Honduras, demonstrations are often accompa-
nied by an intimidating armed security force presence, with aggression resulting.
In Burkina Faso, CSOs have accused the authorities of acts of provocation in order 
to generate violence, which is then used to justify suppression of protests. In Ni-
geria, there are reported cases of violence being instigated by people paid by the 
state, with the police withdrawing protection to enable violence to occur. Cambo-
dian security forces have also been accused of using unprovoked violence against 
demonstrations. There are also instances of peaceful demonstrators wrongly be-
ing deemed to be aggressive and being met with violence and detention in Leba-
non, Nigeria and Zambia. A further concern, in Cambodia, Tunisia and Uganda, is 
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that when complaints are made against excessive use of force by the police, these 
are often not investigated thoroughly or transparently.
Most countries covered by the EENA research impose fines and jail sentences 
on protest behaviour deemed to be illegal. A common criticism, seen for exam-
ple in Cameroon, Honduras, India, Jordan and Zambia, is that the punishments 
available for assembly organisers and participants are broad and harsh. Laws in 
Burkina Faso, Jordan and South Africa hold assembly organisers responsible for 
criminal offences committed during demonstrations or protests. Cambodia and 
Lebanon are among countries in which the organisers of assemblies are required 
to be identified individually; this makes protest organisers feel vulnerable to in-
vestigation and arrest. South African civil society argues that such provisions have 
a chilling effect on assemblies.
Compared to this, the law in the Philippines prohibits security forces from in-
terfering in assemblies, unless they are held without a permit, when this is re-
quired, or become violent. The Philippines Supreme Court has found in favour of 
a ‘maximum tolerance’ approach to the policing of assemblies. Correspondingly, 
the police are assessed to have become more aware of human rights and the 
proper policing of assemblies. Notwithstanding this, there are occasionally vio-
lent incidents.
As with other fundamental civil society rights, the right to freedom of assembly 
is sometimes enabled or denied selectively, depending on the issue at stake. In 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, South Africa and Zambia it is assessed that CSOs that 
adopt positions supportive of the government experience fewer barriers against 
their freedom of assembly, while CSOs that are more critical of the government 
face more restrictions. Permission may be refused in Cambodia if the authorities 
decide that the focus of an assembly is politically sensitive. Events seeking to 
demand human rights and call attention to abuses have received bans in Uganda, 
and experienced a range of responses including hostility, violence and bureau-
cratic interference.
In Sub-Saharan Africa in particular there is a particular challenge around LGBTI as-
semblies. These have been forcibly broken up in Uganda. Since 2014, meetings of 
LGBTI clubs and societies have been banned in Nigeria, while the status of LGBTI 
assemblies remains a grey area in Zambia, since a population that is criminalised 
is unlikely to notify the authorities of the intent to hold a meeting.
A class dimension is observed in how assembly participants are treated in Pana-
ma and South Africa: demonstrations are most at risk of restriction and security 
force violence if participants are poorer people. In Jordan, the law does not treat 
everyone equally: non-nationals and people with past criminal convictions are 
excluded from organising or participating in demonstrations and protests.
Access to information about and understanding of the right of assembly and rel-
evant laws is seen as a barrier against poor and excluded people mobilising in 
South Africa. It is not always well understood or accepted that citizens should 
have a right to protest, even in democratic contexts where formal means of po-
litical participation are available. Because the right is not well recognised by the 
authorities in South Africa, and heavy handed security force response generates 
violence, the authorities may characterise civil society as a source of violence and 
use this to disparage civil society in general. In Jordan, while, a notification regime 
is in place for assemblies, it is difficult to organise spontaneous demonstrations, 
which are not seen as legitimate, even though such protests are an important 
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part of how dissent is expressed. In Brazil, a further challenge is that CSOs lack 
the financial resources to mobilise and promote meetings and events properly.
The right to assembly is not always enjoyed equally within countries. In Hon-
duras, there are some regions with a great deal of insecurity, and curfews are 
imposed, further restricting the freedom of assembly. Similarly, challenges are 
greater outside the capital districts in Mexico and Mozambique and in some parts 
of Cameroon, and local administrators sometimes restrict gatherings in Nepal. 
Challenges that may be experienced from local government officials and local 
political and business interests in the Philippines contrast with the generally per-
missive approach of national government. A lack of awareness of national level 
laws and an absence of local political willingness to apply them may both be is-
sues here. There is also a challenge in Tunisia of key rights such as the freedom of 
assembly being suspended in times when a state of emergency is declared.
 
Conclusion
International best practice, in which CSOs should be free to organise and hold 
events without notifying or seeking approval from state agencies, is largely lack-
ing. Again, a clear divide emerges between approval regimes and notification 
regimes. However, even where a notification regime is in place, the reality is 
often more complex, with government authorities and security forces abusing 
their powers. Decisions on who is to be allowed to hold public events, and which 
kinds of events are acceptable, are often made on politicised grounds. Penal-
ties for organisers and participants, including fines and jail sentences, are often 
broad-ranging, excessive and highly discretionary. There is no strong tolerance of 
spontaneous demonstrations in many contexts. 
Suggested focal points for advocacy could include moving from approval regimes 
to notification regimes, and the urging of greater accountability over the actions 
of security forces, along with better training of security forces in the policing of 
assemblies.
As with the freedoms of association and assembly, there are generally strong 
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression, with limitations made on 
the basis of protecting national security, public order and morality, and ensuring 
the rights and reputations of others. However, in several contexts, there is, once 
again, a gap between constitutional and legal provisions and the reality. Other 
laws, such as those on secrecy, defamation, libel and slander, can undermine the 
freedom of expression.
There are some examples of better practice. In the Philippines, strong constitu-
tional provisions on the freedom of expression have been upheld by a number 
of Supreme Court decisions. Although there are local level challenges, discussed 
further below, the freedom of expression is understood to apply broadly, encom-
passing various media and the wearing of protest symbols, and in the main, the 
assessment reports that CSOs feel free to criticise the government openly.
The denial of key freedoms, including the freedom of expression, fuelled the rev-
olution in Tunisia, and this is reflected in the country’s new constitution, which 
d. Freedom of expression
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states that the freedom of expression, opinion and information will not be sub-
jected to prior censorship, providing these do not impact on the rights of others, 
and with the other usual caveats noted above. The constitution states that any 
limits should be proportionate and should respect the essence of rights. A law 
passed in 2011 prohibits prior censorship, something that is also prohibited by 
the constitution of Mexico, apart from when the freedom of expression impinges 
on privacy, morals and public peace.
Elsewhere, a challenge is that constitutional provisions on the freedom of expres-
sion are excessively undercut. For example, while Nepal’s new constitution up-
holds the freedom of expression, civil society is concerned that the state’s power 
to limit it, as set out in the constitution, is too broad, including on the grounds 
of undermining the sovereignty of Nepal, jeopardising harmonious community 
relations, or contravening ‘decent public behaviour or morality’. The constitution 
also allows the president to suspend the freedom of expression during a state of 
emergency. Further, a challenge for civil society is that the constitution only con-
fers freedom of expression on individual citizens, and not organisations. While 
Nepali CSOs tended to see the political culture at the time of writing as quite per-
missive, and felt largely unencumbered in expressing their views, the challenge is 
that the constitution may provide insufficient protection for CSOs if politics take 
a more regressive turn, given constraints made on the freedom of expression 
under past regimes.
Similarly, while the constitutions of Jordan, Tajikistan and Zambia seem permis-
sive, there are numerous grounds on which the freedom of expression may be 
limited, including those introduced by other laws. In Honduras, constitutional 
provisions on the freedom of expression, and a law on freedom of opinion, are 
not well realised. They are undermined by other laws, including two laws passed 
in 2013, the Law on Telecommunications and the Law of Classification of Public 
Documents Related to Security and National Defence. These are assessed to fos-
ter media censorship. Aspects of the Penal Code in India, enacted during colonial 
British rule and predating India’s republican constitution by 90 years, cut across 
freedom of expression provisions. Elsewhere, imprecise language gives ample 
scope for officials to impose restrictions, such as vague provisions in laws in Leb-
anon on limitations in relation to public ethics, religious feelings and national 
unity. Laws on the media in Cambodia lack clarity and are inconsistently applied.
In some contexts, recently introduced laws impose new limits on the freedom of 
expression. These include laws on terrorism. Jordan’s 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law 
gives particular scope to restrict the freedom of expression, and Tunisia’s 2015 
anti-terrorism laws are broad: some journalists have been accused of promoting 
terrorism in the light of this law. Similar challenges apply in Cameroon, where 
under anti-terrorism legislation passed in 2014, civilians can be put on trial by 
military courts and journalists may need to obtain prior government permission 
before publishing stories. Since the law was passed, several journalists have been 
detained on terrorism-related charges and undergone military trials.
A law introduced in 2010 against racism and discrimination in Bolivia has been 
criticised by some in civil society for potentially giving the state broad scope to 
restrict the freedom of expression, including the power to close down media 
outlets and impose criminal sanctions on journalists. In South Africa, CSOs are 
concerned about the government’s attempt to introduce a new secrecy law, the 
Protection of State Information Bill, which would cut across the freedom of ex-
pression. The proposed law contains a broad definition of what constitutes na-
tional security. The issue remains a source of profound disagreement between 
the government and CSOs. 
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The absence of freedom of information laws and procedures are a related con-
cern. There is a lack of freedom of information law in Cambodia and the Philip-
pines, despite several efforts and intensive civil society advocacy. While Uganda 
has an Access to Information Act, it makes a number of exceptions, and govern-
ment agencies lack guidance on how to implement it. Processes are also expen-
sive and bureaucratic. Similarly, in South Africa, it is assessed that there are barri-
ers put in place by the state against the use of freedom of information provisions, 
which contribute to their insufficient use by civil society. By comparison, India 
has a now well-established law on the freedom of information, although it still 
prohibits the disclosure of some documents under the Official Secrets Act. 
Heavy sanctions for offences can exert a chilling effect on the freedom of ex-
pression. Lebanon’s 1962 Press Law, for example, authorises prison sentences for 
offences committed by journalists. In Cambodia, the Penal Code’s provisions on 
incitement to commit felony are regularly used to instigate proceedings against 
CSOs and activists that criticise the government. Lebanon’s legal system is similar-
ly used to sanction journalists, activists and citizens who criticise political figures 
and expose governance deficits. In Honduras, CSOs report being threatened with 
increased scrutiny, fines and potential deregistration if they criticise government 
policies in the media. 
Many assessments draw attention to the limiting effect of provisions in defa-
mation, libel and slander. These have been observed to restrict the freedom of 
expression in Cameroon, Mozambique and Zambia, with several cases in Zam-
bia of government figures using libel laws to silence critics. In Tunisia out-dated 
laws on criminal defamation, libel and slander sit at odds with the constitution’s 
guarantee of the freedom of expression. These have given scope for political-
ly-driven lawsuits to be used in an attempt to silence independent media outfits 
and practitioners. In Jordan, defamation, criticism of the king, the denigration of 
government officials and the incitement of sectarian strife are all criminalised. 
Penal Codes in Lebanon and Zambia specifically criminalise the defamation of the 
president. In Benin, the 2015 Information and Communication Code provides for 
heavy fines for defaming the president and the heads of state or ministers of for-
eign affairs of foreign countries.  Penalties for defamation are high in Cambodia, 
Cameroon and Lebanon; in Lebanon heavy fines have been levelled against inves-
tigative journalists who exposed corruption. Criminal sanctions for defamation 
also exist in Nigeria and Panama, and Panama has seen numerous criminal defa-
mation cases brought in recent years. There are also assessed to be inadequate 
legal mechanisms that enable journalists to protect sources in South Africa, and 
specific challenges posed by the interpretation of laws to prevent hate speech. 
Even the prospect of being taken to court, and the expenses and energy this en-
tails, can exert a chilling effect on the freedom of expression.
As with the freedom of assembly, the police and security forces can overstep 
their mandates to restrict the freedom of expression, including through force. 
In Uganda, the police have attacked and harassed journalists. Security forces 
overstep the mark sometimes in South Africa as well. In Zambia, the police may 
exploit the out-dated Public Order Law’s provisions on the spreading of false in-
formation to restrict the freedom of expression. Laws that remain on the books 
from the apartheid era in South Africa also restrict the freedom of information, 
for example, relating to locations regarded as relevant to national security. 
Sometimes CSOs have their freedom of expression restricted because they work 
on particularly contested issues. In Bolivia it is reported that CSOs that experience 
particular restriction and harassment include those that seek to protect indige-
nous people’s rights and CSOs that have been working to oppose a large road 
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development project, along with CSOs that work in the field of communications 
and journalism. Land rights campaigners have also experienced restriction and 
attacks in South Africa. In Jordan, CSOs that are related to the Muslim Brother-
hood and that question the monarchy have their freedom of expression partic-
ularly restricted. Again, LGBTI CSOs can face particular restriction. LGBTI groups 
in India are limited in their freedom of expression, and in Nepal, the police have 
acted to suppress movements on issues including LGBTI rights and the status of 
Tibetan refugees. 
Journalists and activists seeking to exercise the freedom of expression are vulner-
able to harassment and violence in several contexts. Because of drug trafficking 
and organised crime, violence is high in some parts of Mexico, with high levels 
of impunity. This undermines constitutional provisions that should guarantee the 
freedom of expression. In Colombia, there are districts with high levels of aggres-
sion and attacks on journalists, and heavy impunity: state protection systems that 
are supposed to protect people who are vulnerable from attack are criticised for 
being disorganised and weak. Activists and journalists also experience attacks, 
ranging from death threats to killings, that limit the freedom of expression in 
Brazil. 
Despite strong constitutional provisions on the freedom of expression in the Phil-
ippines, the country has experienced a spate of extrajudicial killings of activists 
and media practitioners, and a culture of impunity offers an entrenched threat 
to the freedom of expression. Large corporations and their security forces pose a 
particular threat. The current president, inaugurated in 2016, has stated that the 
killing of ‘corrupt’ journalists is justified.
Extremism impinges on the freedom of expression in some areas of India, partic-
ularly when security forces conflate CSOs with extremist forces and restrict their 
freedom of expression as part of anti-extremism measures. Similarly, despite 
strong constitutional provisions in Tunisia, reactionary and extremist forces have 
harassed and attacked activists and media practitioners, and this goes alongside 
government attacks on media sources that criticise it. Tunisia’s National Union of 
Journalists has called attention to repeated encroachments on media freedom, 
with increasing numbers of media practitioners being put on trial and jailed. 
Nigerian CSOs report experiencing harassment from state officials that impinges 
on their freedom of expression. Smear campaigns have been mounted against 
CSOs in Panama. CSOs and journalists have been threatened by both government 
and private sector sources in Mozambique. Threats were particularly experi-
enced during 2014, an election year, which saw growing political polarisation, 
with threats coming particularly when CSOs and the media criticised prominent 
politicians or raised sensitive issues. 
Attacks on CSOs can indirectly impact on the freedom of expression by causing 
CSOs to self-censor to avoid further attacks. This is reported to be the case in 
Bolivia, where government hostility towards CSOs fuels a climate of intimidation 
that encourages self-censorship; some CSOs believe that the government has no 
tolerance of criticism. In Honduras as well, civil society remains cautious, mindful 
of the attacks made on it during the 2009 coup, and is careful not to be seen to 
be attacking the government directly. Cambodian CSOs have generally learned 
which criticisms are likely to be tolerated and which will not, and tend to avoid 
criticising particular government officials. CSOs in South Africa also report making 
tactical choices about what they criticise and what they refrain from criticising. 
In Panama there is said to be a lack an appreciation of the culture of dissent, with 
little popular understanding of and education about the freedom of expression, 
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and the right to information. Cultural factors in South Africa, such as patriarchal 
relationships, and in Zambia, such as notions of respect for elders, may also inhib-
it equal access to the freedom of expression.
In the Philippines, there is concern that the ability of civil society at the nation-
al level to exercise the freedom of expression is not reflected at the local level, 
where powerful elites can dominate local governance. This is also assessed to be 
the case in Cameroon and Colombia, where attacks on the media and civil society 
are concentrated in particular locations. In South Africa, it is assessed that cir-
cumstances influence a citizen’s ability to enjoy the freedom of expression: poor 
people living in townships are less able to exercise this right, because local power 
structures prevent it. People may live in areas that the constitution and laws do 
not reach in reality. Similarly, in Jordan, the middle classes are more easily able to 
enjoy the freedom of expression. In Zambia, foreign CSO workers are wary about 
expressing their opinions, as they risk deportation.
Traditional media
In some countries, vibrant and independent print and broadcast media offer plat-
forms for debate and dissent, but experience some state pushback. Cameroon 
has a wide number of privately-owned newspapers that are often critical of the 
government, although the country has also seen independent journalists arrest-
ed and some media outlets banned. Similarly, civil society sees Uganda’s media as 
a still relatively young and growing sector, with a dynamic privately owned radio 
and newspaper culture. However, there is civil society concern about growing 
government interference with the media on dubious national security grounds. 
There is also little reporting of CSOs and their work in Uganda. In Benin, the EENA 
assessed the media to be independent and pluralist, but noted that it is ham-
pered by a number of politicised interventions of the state regulator.
The attitudes of the media towards civil society can also make it harder for civil 
society to enjoy the freedom of expression: the media may run stories that are 
hostile towards civil society, spread misinformation about it, or deny civil society 
a platform. For example, the media may run stories that position CSOs as ineffi-
cient, corrupt or partisan. The assessment in Brazil, informed by ongoing media 
monitoring, is that the media is broadly positive when it mentions civil society as 
a whole, but negative about individual CSOs. 
Poor civil society access to the media may result from low media capacity, and 
patterns of concentrated media ownership. In Cambodia, it is assessed that local 
media have weak capacity to report on CSOs’ activities in the national Khmer lan-
guage. Lack of training and an expectation of payment in return for coverage are 
related issues. This results in an absence of objective reporting on civil society. A 
lack of journalism skills is also identified as a challenge in Uganda.
CSOs in Panama find it difficult to get their messages across in a media that is 
dominated by the economically and politically powerful. Similarly, in Mexico, an 
oligarchical concentration of media ownership makes it hard for civil society to 
make its voices heard. The state and ruling party are seen to dominate media 
ownership in Bolivia and Cambodia. Government dominance in Bolivia produces 
a fearful and compliant media, and in Cambodia there are few radio stations or 
newspapers that are not run by political parties or individual politicians; the state 
has intervened to take some independent broadcasts off air. In Zambia as well, 
the government has restricted the ability of critical radio stations to broadcast, 
30
and has threatened to remove licences. This makes radio stations less likely to 
broadcast critical voices from civil society. 
In Uganda, there are broad grounds on which state authorities may refuse to issue 
media licences. The Ugandan government is also able to dictate the timing and 
duration of some broadcasts, and in 2014 mandated that all radio stations must 
reserve two hours per week to transmit government programmes. Newspapers 
are not allowed to publish without a licence from the statutory Media Council. 
The related law, the Press and Journalist Act of 1995, amended in 2010, provides 
harsh sanctions of fines and jail sentences for publishing without a licence or 
publishing prohibited material, something that is broadly defined. It seems clear 
that provisions framed as intended to uphold national security are rather applied 
to silence dissent.
Challenges such as these can leave CSOs mistrusting media outlets and not seeing 
them as a suitable locus for engagement.
Internet and social media
Given challenges with conventional media, many CSOs have turned to embrace 
the possibilities of social media.
In several contexts, such as Bolivia and Panama, the law has not kept pace with 
the growth of internet access. An absence of regulation can work in civil society’s 
favour, seen for example in Cambodia, where relative internet freedom contrasts 
with the significant restriction of conventional media. CSOs are seen to have tak-
en advantage of this potential. However, a lack of laws can also challenge civil 
society: in the absence of relevant laws in Lebanon, it is noted that the courts 
tend to classify information shared on the internet as publications rather than 
private correspondence, meaning that more serious sanctions apply. In Tajikistan, 
the development in internet access and usage is considered to have outstripped 
the pace of the law, leaving a need for a consolidated internet and freedom of 
information law.
Greater attention is now turning to the policing of the internet and social media, 
seen for example in Honduras and Mexico. The growth of social media in Hondu-
ras is seen to have given citizens new scope to express their opinions, but CSOs 
also report having social media pages blocked with no explanation. There seems 
in the Philippines to be a creeping use of the 2012 Cybercrime Prevention Act’s 
provisions on libel to suppress civil society work to expose the malpractice and 
negative impacts of large companies. There is also concern about the potential 
application of the 2010 Interception of Communications Act and the 2011 Misuse 
of Computers Act in Uganda. In Nepal, it is a criminal offence to publish illegal ma-
terial on the internet. Amendments to the law in Jordan introduced in 2012 mean 
that prior permission must be sought to publish electronic publications, extend-
ing the government’s reach. In Nigeria, it is alleged that there is large scale inter-
net surveillance carried out by a private company contracted by the government, 
and new proposals have been brought forward to intercept communications.
The regulation of the internet and social media remains an evolving area. Cam-
bodia’s government has drafted a law to regulate internet use and prevent cyber-
crime, which gives rise to concern that new restrictions will be introduced. At the 
time of writing the draft legislation in reported as being in a process of revision. 
The president of Bolivia has also stated a desire to introduce stronger regulation 
of social media. More positively, a new law in Brazil, the Civil Rights Framework 
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for the Internet, was passed in 2014 following extensive civil society advocacy, 
and introduces new protections for online freedom of expression. In Mexico, civil 
society has recently been involved in consultations on regulatory reform of tele-
communications, although the effects of this reform are yet to work through.
CSOs also in general face the challenge of how to get their voices across in a 
crowded social media market place, and of limited capacities to engage with so-
cial media, and the media as a whole. 
Conclusion
The freedom of expression is being contested in many contexts, with constitu-
tional guarantees being subject to too many exceptions and undercut by other 
laws. In some contexts, there is political interference in the media, including state 
control, and state and non-state forces harass, attack and criminalise civil society 
activists and journalists when they use their freedom of speech to express dis-
sent and raise critical issues. Such measures can encourage self-censorship. The 
make-up and ownership of traditional media is not always conducive to civil so-
ciety access, and social media offers an alternative, but is increasingly becoming 
contested and more tightly regulated.
Suggested focal points for advocacy could include supporting networks of inde-
pendent journalists, and making connections between these and CSOs, and ad-
vocating on the importance of pluralist media ownership and internet access and 
freedom.
The EENA identifies access to resources as a key enabling factor for CSOs, since 
without resources, most CSOs cannot sustain their operations. The assessments 
looked in particular at the extent to which CSOs are able to obtain funding from 
international donors, their domestic governments, domestic philanthropy and 
the corporate sector.
In most contexts, the picture painted by the assessments is that CSOs are experi-
encing an enduring struggle for resources, including as a consequence of restric-
tions on civil society that make it harder to receive funding, as well as changing 
donor priorities. In Honduras, both domestic state and international support are 
assessed to be in decline, and in many other contexts, including South Africa and 
Zambia, CSOs report that funding for civil society is dwindling. A lack of funding 
in Panama has seen several long-standing CSOs forced to close down, while many 
Cameroonian CSOs survive on a month-to-month basis.
Core support in particular is under strain. For example, CSOs in Cambodia, the 
Philippines and Zambia report that there is a lack of support for the governance 
functions and staff costs of CSOs. In India and the Philippines, flexible funding 
for CSOs is reported to be falling, with most grants to CSO short-term and proj-
ect-specific. CSOs in Burkina Faso assess that the project orientation of much of 
the funding available is not conducive to the long term development of civil soci-
ety and the public sphere.
e. Access to resources
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Not all trends are negative. In Brazil and Mexico, for example, the conditions for 
domestic state support to CSOs are assessed to have improved in recent years, 
albeit these countries have simultaneously seen international funding sources 
decline.
International resourcing
In most contexts, the preeminent funding relationship for CSOs that took part in 
the research is with international funders, and specifically bilateral and multilat-
eral donors. The importance of international donors is such that in several coun-
tries, the relationship can be characterised as one of dependency. For example, 
it is assessed that 60 per cent of CSO funding in Cambodia comes from interna-
tional donors, and international donors are also cited as the key source of CSO 
funding in Cameroon, Honduras, Nepal, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Tunisia and 
Zambia. A heavy dependence by CSOs on funding from the European Union (EU) 
in particular is reported in Lebanon, and on international CSOs as well as bilateral 
and multilateral donors in Mozambique.
In many contexts, this reliance on foreign funding is now being exposed as do-
nors withdraw from countries that have progressed from least developed country 
status, consistent with the general trend identified in past CIVICUS research of 
donors becoming more strategic and concentrating their support on fewer coun-
tries.1 This is noted in diverse contexts, including Bolivia, Cambodia, Colombia, 
India and Panama. In the Philippines, funding is seen to have declined in the last 
decade, compared to previous decades, when donors made the restoration of 
democracy a priority of their support. A similar pattern applies in Brazil. As is not-
ed in South Africa and Zambia, this withdrawal comes even when there has been 
very little growth of domestic funding to substitute for international resources. 
There has been a recent shift of support in Lebanon away from CSOs oriented 
around human rights, advocacy and accountability towards humanitarian sup-
port for refugees from Syria. In Bolivia, it is also suggested that growing state 
interference with CSOs may also be deterring donors.
While a general shortage of funding is observed in the Philippines, it is noted that 
there are donor funds available for some themes, such as disaster risk reduction 
and management, but the challenge is that most CSOs lack the capacities to im-
plement successful projects: there is a mismatch between donor priorities and 
CSO capabilities. The availability of donor funding on some themes has led to 
CSO work in other important areas, such as community organising, to decline, 
because it lacks donor support and CSOs focus on activities for which funding is 
available. The concern in the Philippines is that such changes could undermine 
CSOs’ ability to undertake advocacy work on behalf of local communities, and the 
legitimacy that CSOs enjoy with citizens.
The example of the Philippines highlights a danger that high CSO reliance on in-
ternational support can make CSOs seem donor-driven, as CSOs orient to fulfil 
donor priorities and requirements, and risk being seen as essentially contract-
ed to deliver donor missions. This is, for example, a concern in Cambodia and 
Zambia, and in Lebanon, where it is stated that domestic CSOs have little control 
over a civil society resourcing agenda that is largely determined by international 
funders. It is also an issue in Tunisia, which has seen an influx of donor funding 
following the 2011 revolution, and where it is reported that donors may impose 
conditions that change the goals and nature of an activity as a condition of pro-
1  CIVICUS Essay’, 2015 State of Civil Society Report, CIVICUS, http://www.civicus.org/documents/
reports-and-publications/SOCS/2015/summaries/SOCS2015CIVICUSEssay.pdf 
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viding funding. CSOs in Nepal are also concerned that the imposition of donor 
agendas is hindering the autonomy of civil society.
If CSOs are overly influenced by donor policies, it calls into question the autono-
my of CSOs, and their ability to root themselves in the concerns of communities. 
It also plays to criticisms of civil society, particularly those made by governments, 
that civil society agendas are overly influenced by foreign governments, and that 
CSOs act in effect as the agents of foreign powers, rather than advance domesti-
cally grounded agendas. These criticisms can undermine public trust in CSOs, and 
thereby their legitimacy. This is acknowledged as an issue in Uganda, where some 
CSOs heavily supported by donors have weak social bases. There are also con-
cerns, raised for example in South Africa, that the receipt of donor funding can 
cause CSOs to self-censor, so as not to damage their relations with their donors.
The receipt of international funding has been strongly questioned in India over 
recent years, where increased government hostility towards the advocacy and 
accountability functions of civil society have combined with a withdrawal of 
some donors, making it harder for CSOs to access resources. The Foreign Contri-
bution Regulation Act (FCRA), introduced in 2010, tightens controls by banning 
CSOs from receiving international funding for activities that are deemed to be 
of a political nature or against the public interest. It also uses vague terms such 
as ‘security, scientific, economic and strategic interest of the state’ that can be 
easily invoked to deny funding to organisations uncovering high level corruption 
or widespread human rights violations. These are broad categories that lack defi-
nition. The FCRA also states that CSOs must re-register every five years in order to 
continue to receive contributions, and gives wide scope to reject applications to 
register. Since its introduction many CSO have their registrations under the FCRA 
withdrawn, preventing them from receiving international funding. Because of de-
lays these actions have caused in accessing international funding, some Indian 
CSOs have had to suspend activities or cancel planned events. The state has also 
aggressively pursued the Indian arm of Greenpeace through the courts to freeze 
its bank accounts and try to close its operations in India. 
India is not alone in restricting CSOs’ access to international funding. In Jordan, 
CSOs must receive prior government approval to receive international funding. 
Similarly, in Nepal, for any amounts of more than approximately US$2,000, agree-
ments between CSOs and donors must be approved by the Social Welfare Council, 
unless they relate to emergency relief. Zambian CSOs are also supposed to obtain 
presidential approval to receive funding from a foreign government, although in 
practice, this regulation is not strictly adhered to.
Further, and consistent with the growing emphasis on alignment outlined in the 
earlier section on CSO operations, Nepal’s Development Cooperation Policy of 
2014 requires projects that receive funding to be aligned with national devel-
opment priorities, for the project proposal to be coordinated with the relevant 
government ministry, and for the government to determine how the project is 
implemented. Affiliation with the Social Welfare Council is mandatory for all CSOs 
that receive international or domestic state funding. Applications for permission 
may be rejected on grounds that they are against the national interest, which is 
not defined. As in India, as well as impinging on the autonomy of CSO operations, 
such stipulations have practical repercussions: the lengthy process in gaining ap-
proval mitigates against CSOs securing rapid or short-term funding. In Jordan as 
well, permission is often delayed and sometimes refused, which makes it harder 
for CSOs to develop and sustain relations with donors, and has caused the loss of 
some funding.
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In Tunisia, the 2011 Decree-Law on Associations stipulates the acceptable funding 
sources of CSOs registered under it, limiting them to membership subscription, 
state support, revenues generated by activities and domestic and foreign dona-
tions. CSOs registered under the Act cannot receive support from states that do 
not have diplomatic relations with Tunisia, or from organisations linked to those 
states. 
At the time of writing, a draft law before the legislature in Nigeria, the Foreign 
Contributions Bill, would require CSOs to be registered and receive prior approval 
for the receipt of international funds, and mandate that all funded projects must 
be approved by the state. The bill would also introduce a new agency to monitor 
how CSOs spend funds received from donors. Civil society advocacy has helped 
to slow the progress of this bill, which threatens to restrict severely the ability of 
CSOs to access resources. 
In contrast no legal restrictions on the receipt of funds were reported in Lebanon, 
Mexico, Mozambique, Panama, the Philippines, South Africa and Tajikistan. Often 
the requirement, as in Panama and Tajikistan, is that CSOs must keep a regis-
ter of funds received and report periodically to the authorities. While there are 
also no restrictions on the receipt of funds in Bolivia, the reporting requirements 
are more stringent: quarterly reporting of the spending of all donations must be 
made, accompanied by supporting documentation. 
In Tunisia, notwithstanding the limitations noted above, other aspects of the law 
on CSOs’ receipt of funding can be seen to be more enabling: the bank accounts of 
CSOs can only be frozen with prior judicial decision, and rather than seek permis-
sion, CSOs need only maintain a register of different resources received and pub-
lish details of foreign funding received in print. However, very few CSOs adhere 
to this stipulation, and this gives rise to a concern specific to the context, relating 
to the legitimacy of CSOs. There is concern among Tunisian civil society about the 
existence of fake CSOs, which provide fronts for corruption, the financing of po-
litical parties or terrorism financing. As discussed earlier in the dimension on CSO 
operations, legitimate CSOs in Tunisia are keen for greater enforcement of good 
governance guarantees, so that they can distinguish themselves from illegitimate 
organisations, not least in the eyes of citizens who may be growing more sceptical 
about civil society. One challenge here is that laws relating to the prevention of 
terrorism and money laundering overlap with laws on CSO regulation, and are 
vaguely stated, giving rise to differing interpretations and contradictions.
There are also concerns that the availability of international funding in Lebanon 
has fuelled corruption among civil society. Elsewhere, laws introduced to prevent 
money laundering and terrorism financing impact on civil society. Anti-money 
laundering regulations in Uganda make it harder to receive funds, as they intro-
duce more stringent requirements to document the sources and uses of funding. 
An anti-money laundering law has also been recently introduced in Mexico. Its 
repercussions for civil society are yet to be seen, and this will be an important 
area to monitor.
While CSOs in Honduras do not need prior permission to receive funds, more 
restrictive policies have been introduced following legislation to prevent mon-
ey laundering and terrorism financing. International donors are now only able 
to support CSOs that are deemed by the government to have complied with its 
standards, giving the state a veto on which CSOs can receive international fund-
ing. The Honduras EENA reports that these restrictions are causing donors to de-
crease or withdraw their support to Honduran CSOs. 
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Donors may also have the inadvertent effect of reinforcing other restrictive laws 
and regulations. For example, a Zambian CSO campaign to boycott registration 
under the restrictive NGO Act was partly stymied by donor insistence that any 
CSOs they support should be registered under the domestic registration regime. 
Such policies pay little heed to the quality of the registration regime. Further, 
in Zambia the government pressured donors to only support CSOs that were 
registered under the NGO Act, before it was suspended, which impinged on the 
autonomy of CSOs and donors by, in effect, stipulating a list of CSOs deemed ac-
ceptable for funding. 
There are broader issues around registration and receipt of funding. Registration 
is also a prerequisite for CSOs to receive funding in Panama, but because of the 
challenges in registration discussed earlier, the effect is to exclude many small, 
community-based or nascent CSOs from qualifying to receive funding. Similar 
challenges apply in Honduras and Mozambique. This can effectively lock CSOs 
into exclusion from funding that would help them grow. Unregistered CSOs also 
face this challenge in Cambodia and Uganda, but in those contexts CSOs are often 
able to circumvent it by partnering with registered CSOs.
In many contexts, donor policies are assessed to work against new and small 
CSOs. It is reported that in Mexico, donors tend not to support newly formed 
CSOs because of requirements that they must have been in existence for a min-
imum number of years, and that in Mozambique they do not support CSOs that 
lack a demonstrable track record. Similarly, in Nepal, it is reported that new CSOs 
find it difficult to establish relations with donors, which tend to support a small 
circle of well-established CSOs and international CSOs with a presence in Nepal. 
The donor funding that is available for CSOs in the Philippines is seen to favour 
larger CSOs and consortiums of CSOs, rather than smaller CSOs, and to be driv-
ing competition between CSOs. An unequal competition for resources between 
smaller and larger CSOs is also observed in Cameroon, South Africa and Zambia, 
where locally registered international CSOs are seen to have an advantage over 
domestic CSOs. CSOs in Burkina Faso report that many international funds, such 
as those of the EU, predominantly support international CSOs with a presence in 
the country, rather than domestic CSOs. The policies of donors, when they insist 
that CSOs provide part-funding from alternate sources, are seen as exacerbating 
this inequality. In Mozambique, donor trends of funding consortiums of organisa-
tions and channelling funds through intermediaries – which may be international 
CSOs or private consulting firms, which retain some resources – has led to many 
individual CSOs experiencing declining funding. A move to basket funding and 
consortium approaches in Uganda has also decreased the number of funding op-
portunities available for CSOs. Small CSOs tend to struggle to develop the man-
agement systems that donors expect to see in Uganda.
Limited CSO capacity to make proposals to donors is identified as an issue in Bo-
livia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, particularly for 
smaller CSOs. Language is a challenge in Tajikistan, with most donors using En-
glish. Related issues in Mozambique include limited capacity to implement do-
nor-funded projects, and limited information about the available funding oppor-
tunities. 
There are concerns in Mozambique and Tajikistan about a lack of transparency 
on how funding decisions are made, with an absence of feedback that would 
encourage learning. CSOs that have personal connections to donors are seen to 
have stronger opportunities in Mozambique. There are also concerns in Nepal 
about the lengthy procedures involved in obtaining donor funding.
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A further dynamic is being seen in global south countries that have also become 
contributors of official development assistance (ODA). While the governments of 
Brazil and India are now providing ODA, it is difficult for CSOs in those countries 
to send money abroad or establish presences in foreign countries. This makes it 
hard for CSOs to partner with their governments in international activities. Fur-
ther, in India CSOs report that they have little opportunity for influence over their 
government’s ODA decisions, which are seen as largely opaque and erratic.
Domestic state resourcing
Overall, there are few countries among those covered by the research in which 
there is considered to be an enabling domestic state resourcing environment. 
In several contexts, there is no domestic state funding available for CSOs, or it is 
very limited. In contexts where funding is available, it is often for a narrow range 
of themes related to social welfare, service delivery and humanitarian actions, 
and in the form of contracts to provide services for projects tightly defined by the 
state. 
Government funding is not available to CSOs in Nigeria, and there is no estab-
lished structure to provide public support to CSOs in Mozambique, with little do-
mestic state funding apart from for some specific areas, such as HIV/AIDS. Zambia 
also lacks a policy framework for state resourcing of CSOs, while state funding is 
seen as a still emerging area in Tajikistan, and a unified legal framework has not 
yet been developed. There is a lack of a partnership structure in Cambodia that 
would enable funding cooperation between CSOs and the state, compared to 
structures for cooperation between the government, the private sector and do-
nors. There are however some international funds channelled through the gov-
ernment of Cambodia that are available to CSOs. Processes for accessing such 
funds are seen to be clear, but still bureaucratic, and many CSOs do not succeed 
in accessing these.
There is little state funding in Burkina Faso, and what is available is tied to specific 
development themes. In Uganda, there is some limited sub-granting by the gov-
ernment for service delivery, but CSOs observe that this does not support their 
development. 
Some state funding is available in Cameroon, India, Lebanon and Panama, but 
not for CSO activities associated with the promotion of human rights, democracy, 
transparency and accountability, the development of policy and the tackling of 
corruption.
There is only one state funding stream available in Bolivia, the Indigenous Fund, 
which has been accused of poor management and corruption, and there are some 
competitive bidding processes for development projects funded by internation-
al donors, for which CSOs can apply. However, given strained relations between 
many CSOs and the government, there are concerns about the implications for 
the perceived autonomy of CSOs should they accept domestic government fund-
ing.
Concerns about CSO autonomy are seen in several other contexts. For example, 
in Mozambique, CSOs are required to have registered for public benefit status 
to receive state funds. This means declaring that they are pursuing the national 
interest and cooperating with the public administration. Such a declaration can 
act as a deterrent for CSOs, as they may be seen as having been captured by the 
state. Challenges often arise when CSOs partner with the government, and re-
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ceive state funds, typically to provide services. The partnership is rarely an equal 
one, and the risk for CSOs that receive domestic state funds is that they can be-
come viewed as an arm of government, and are seen to concede some degree of 
autonomy. For example, in India and South Africa it is considered that the govern-
ment views CSOs that it supports and works with as essentially sub-contractors, 
rather than partners. There are also concerns about the instrumentalisation of 
CSOs receiving state funds in Mexico, and in Colombia this issue at the heart of 
civil society concerns about proposed new contract-based procedures that are 
being introduced for cooperation between the state and CSOs. When CSOs are 
relegated to the status of sub-contractors, their autonomy is compromised and 
their value as a source of solutions and alternatives is diminished.
Concerns about a lack of transparency in state funding decisions and the poten-
tial this creates for favouritism and corruption come out strongly across the as-
sessments. In Tunisia, CSOs can apply for tenders issued by the state authorities, 
and broadly, CSOs see funding decisions as being made in a politically neutral 
way, but the criteria are not clear. There is also concern about the lack of clear civ-
il society representation in the body that makes decisions on state funding, and 
the role of some state officials who also have a role in a CSO, which may lead to 
favouritism. Further, CSOs assess that application processes are complex, oppor-
tunities are often not well advertised, and it is frequently a condition that funding 
may not go to CSOs that have not previously received funding. Such provisions 
can serve to lock in selective support and privilege. State funding is reported to 
have increased in Tunisia since the 2011 revolution, but there is a lack of clear 
information on what amount of state funding is going to CSOs and how many 
CSOs receive it, in part caused by some lags in CSO reporting. Given this lack of 
transparency, there is some concern that much funding is going to CSOs in which 
government officials play a role.
Favouritism is also identified as an issue in Cameroon and Mozambique, where 
few CSOs benefit from state funds, and are considered to have privileged access, 
and Burkina Faso, where there are CSOs headed by people close to the govern-
ment that are viewed to be best placed to access funds. In India, public officials 
are alleged to have created pseudo CSOs for the purpose of accessing state funds, 
and in Jordan, organisations linked to the royal family are said to enjoy better ac-
cess to funds and more freedom from regulation. There is also concern that CSOs 
in Jordan and South Africa may self-censor when they have funding relationships 
with the state.
In Nepal and South Africa the distribution of state funds is also criticised for being 
opaque, unpredictable and characterised by favouritism, with few CSOs able to 
benefit. There are similar concerns about transparency in the allocation of state 
funding in Panama, while in Lebanon a lack of transparency fuels allegations of 
favouritism and corruption, with the implication that access to resources is de-
pendent on personal connections and political considerations. Criticisms about 
opaque and lengthy application procedures, which generate accusations of se-
lectivity and favouritism, are also made in India, where excessive bureaucracy 
is identified as a further problem. Concern about privileged access leading to 
corruption also manifests in Colombia. In Honduras, it is assessed that access to 
state funding is impossible for most CSOs, which are unable to undergo excessive 
application and compliance procedures; only large CSOs can benefit, and only 
then if they have good political connections.
A major challenge in Jordan is that procedures for accessing the single available 
source of state funds change frequently, making decisions unpredictable. In Co-
lombia and Panama, complex procedures to win contracts are exacerbated by 
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competition from businesses, which may be better positioned to succeed. In Co-
lombia it is assessed that the private sector is much more easily able to access 
state funding than civil society. 
In the Philippines the constitution recognises that CSOs may benefit from govern-
ment funds, providing they submit to official audits. However, most CSOs still rely 
on non-government funds. This is in part because the process of obtaining fund-
ing is complex, and the requirements highly rigorous. New rules introduced after 
a recent corruption scandal involving fake CSOs mean that CSOs are required to 
undergo an accreditation process before they can receive any state funds. This 
is bureaucratic and lengthy, and many CSOs lack the knowledge to navigate the 
process. As an indicator of these difficulties, several government projects that 
mandate partnerships with CSOs have been put on hold because of low uptake 
by CSOs.
However, the EENA assessments reveal some more positive recent experiences 
in accessing state funding for CSOs. The growth of cooperation between CSOs 
and the government in Brazil, which sees CSOs accessing state funds, has led to 
the development of new, more enabling law to govern relations, the Partnership 
Cooperation Agreement of 2014. The new law provides clear guidance on the 
regulation of government funding partnerships with CSOs, and enables CSOs to 
propose projects for state funding, as well as bid for funding to implement gov-
ernment projects. CSOs generally see the new law positively, and are committed 
to making it work. However, they acknowledge a need now to cultivate other 
sources of funding to complement state funds. It is also noted that historically 
the proportion of state funds that goes to CSOs compared to local government 
structures is low.
CSOs in Mexico also report that they are able to obtain funds from the federal 
government, and the trend has mostly been one of increasing support. However, 
they encounter challenges, because the procedures for obtaining funding can be 
onerous, and the amounts of funding given are often inadequate: the ambitions 
of funding schemes are not matched by the resources available. Further, delays 
in the release of resources, coupled with requirements that funds be spent in the 
same financial year, can hinder the efficiency and effectiveness of CSO actions. 
Delays in receiving committed state funds are also recognised as causing chal-
lenges in India.
In Nepal, a further challenge is that the levels of funding available from govern-
ment agencies are low. While the existing legal framework does not place bar-
riers on domestic state support of CSOs, and the law makes provision for CSOs 
to receive resources to carry out services when they can do so more efficiently 
than the state, there is not yet an established culture of providing government 
funding to CSOs. It is reported that there is a lack of a policy of using CSO services 
to achieve efficiency gains, and a practice instead of turning to expensive profes-
sional consultancy services. There is, however, some optimism that funding rela-
tions are gradually improving, consistent with the general upward improvement 
in CSO-government cooperation in Nepal, discussed further below.
CSOs in Brazil and Mexico also assess that there is a less enabling funding environ-
ment and much less funding available at the sub-national levels of government.
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Philanthropy and income generation
Given the challenges in receiving international and domestic state funding, CSOs 
are often urged to diversify their funding bases and obtain more support from 
non-state sources, including by accessing philanthropy and corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR), and generating their own income. It however remains a com-
mon concern across different countries that there is little domestic giving to civil 
society, both from citizens and businesses. 
For example, in Bolivia, Cameroon, Panama and Zambia, assessments find that 
there is little domestic culture of philanthropy towards CSOs. The same applies 
in Mexico, where most individual giving goes to other individuals in the form of 
charity. In Tajikistan, philanthropy is particularly linked with religion, and in Cam-
bodia, giving tends to go to religious causes or political parties rather than CSOs. 
Philanthropy exists in Nigeria, but it mostly goes to sport, health and education 
causes. Philanthropy is not seen as a realistic prospect in Uganda because of dif-
ficult economic conditions and low incomes, apart from current practices of do-
nating to faith-based organisations. A further reported challenge in Burkina Faso 
is that state officials may put pressure on potential donors to deter them giving 
to CSOs with which the government disagrees.
When it comes to CSOs generating more of their own income, there is gradu-
al recognition of the need for this in Mozambique, and there are some limited 
attempts in Uganda, including through developing consultancy services. Some 
Ugandan CSOs, in fields such as agriculture, conservation and tourism, have been 
successful in generating income, but overall self-generated funds constitute a 
small part of CSO income. Similarly, some CSOs in Zambia are generating income 
through service fees and consultancy work, although there are capacity challeng-
es here. There has been a growth in income generation in Cambodia, with some 
CSOs morphing into social enterprises.
If CSOs are to seek donations from individuals and companies and generate more 
of their own income, they need a supportive tax regime. But often the tax envi-
ronment does little to encourage giving to CSOs, or give CSOs tax relief on reve-
nues they receive and expenses they incur. The existence of some tax incentives 
is recognised in Mexico, Panama and Nepal. Individual donations are also tax 
exempt in Tajikistan, and CSOs are exempt from paying tax, unless they receive 
profit from a business activity. However, there are limitations on tax exemptions 
in many contexts. The tax relief on donations to a CSO in Nepal only covers ap-
proximately US$1,000 of donations, while in Mexico and Panama, CSOs have to 
go through an additional process of submitting documentation to qualify for tax 
exemption.
There are further challenges in Nepal: while CSOs are generally held to be exempt 
from Value Added Tax (VAT), VAT registration is required to access public funding, 
which adds a burden to CSOs. Microfinance activity is taxed, and there has been 
dispute about the tax exempt status of CSOs registered as not-for-profit compa-
nies. Overall, taxation regulations on CSOs in Nepal are assessed to lack detail, 
and it is burdensome to apply for tax exempt status. Similarly, while tax exemp-
tions are granted to Honduran CSOs, the process of qualifying, as with any pro-
cess of registration in Honduras, involves a lack of coordination and duplication of 
work between several different government agencies, and is criticised for being 
expensive, lengthy and offering considerable scope for government discretion. 
This means that many CSOs choose not to go through the process of seeking an 
exemption. Tax exemption is also often denied on donations if a donation is seen 
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to not to match a CSO’s purpose. In India, the tax regime is regarded as complex 
and not enabling, and in Tunisia, laws on tax exemption are unclear and reported 
to be beyond the competence of most CSOs to understand and apply. 
Elsewhere, tax exemptions and tax incentives to encourage donations are seen 
as largely lacking. There are some in Bolivia, but these are assessed to not be 
set up to encourage giving. In Brazil, they are minimal. There are no reported tax 
incentives to promote individual giving in Cameroon or Nigeria, while almost all 
tax exemptions for CSOs were removed in Zambia in 2013. Recent tax reform in 
Colombia has also become less enabling for philanthropy, by lowering the per-
centage of donations that are exempt from tax.
In addition to these deficits, in some contexts there are specific laws that make 
it harder for CSOs to seek and generate income. For example, in India, the law 
makes even small scale fundraising activities taxable, and imposes a limit of five 
years on the holding by CSOs of surplus income, which makes it hard for CSOs to 
build up reserves to cover core costs and to bridge between periods for which 
they have project funding. In Bolivia, the law also forbids CSOs from making any 
profits on their activities, with the punishment being the removal of a CSO’s tax 
exempt status. The law is more obstructive still in Jordan: CSOs must obtain pri-
or government approval to run domestic fundraising campaigns, a month in ad-
vance, and cannot hold more than two fundraising campaigns for the same proj-
ect within one year. The legal emphasis that CSOs should be non-profit in Zambia 
is also assessed to deter CSOs from developing alternative income streams. In 
addition, there is concern in South Africa about new regulations on direct mar-
keting that are coming into force, which could make it harder for CSOs to seek 
donations.
Such challenges in generating income can be contrasted with the situation in 
Nepal, where apart from restrictions on those CSOs registered as not-for-profit 
companies, there are no specific limitations on CSOs receiving or distributing in-
come and profits, and earning income from membership fees and donations from 
members of the public. In Tunisia as well, CSOs are allowed to raise revenues, for 
example, from the disposal of property.
An alternative approach is offered by a scheme in Brazil, the National Fund for 
Children and Adolescents, which channels donations from citizens that are given 
as part of their income tax, from which CSOs can benefit. Discussion is under 
way about the creation of further such funds. However, a challenge here is that 
citizens often want to know precisely what they are donating to. Similar barriers 
to philanthropy identified in Nigeria include concerns over misuse of funds, trans-
parency and accountability, and a wish by the giver to see clear impact. It can be 
particularly hard for CSOs engaged in work to uphold human rights and democra-
cy, enhance accountability and undertake accountability to respond to such con-
cerns, compared to CSOs that deliver services and offer charitable activity.
One response to such challenges has been made in the Philippines, where a CSO 
self-certification scheme exists. This aims to demonstrate that CSOs fulfil good 
governance standards that qualify them as acceptable organisations to receive 
donations. However, many CSOs involved in this scheme do not believe it has 
led to increased donations, and as a result, around 20 per cent of CSOs certi-
fied under the scheme allow their memberships to lapse. The scheme on its own 
has not been sufficient to enable CSOs that have not previously benefited from 
philanthropy to tap into it.
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
It is assessed that CSR is also limited in many contexts, and there is often compe-
tition between CSOs and private sector foundations.
Little awareness of the potential of CSR is reported in Bolivia and Burkina Faso. 
Further, in Bolivia there are assessed to be few companies of sufficient size that 
would be able to give at a significant scale. Compared to this, in Mozambique 
there is seen to be more potential, with the presence of several large and mul-
tinational companies, but procedures to qualify for CSR are complex, counting 
against many CSOs, and there is a lack of information about opportunities.
Inevitably, suspicions also occur that CSR is principally concerned with improving 
the public image of corporations, a view expressed for example in Panama. There 
is also concern in Brazil and Zambia about how CSR can be linked to the promo-
tion of businesses, and with the potential for businesses to seek to instrumental-
ise the CSOs they donate to in Brazil.
In India, a law to mandate large corporations to give two per cent of average prof-
its to CSR might have been expected to generate fresh revenue for CSOs, given 
that high levels of economic growth have led to an increase in interest in both 
individual and corporate philanthropy in recent years. But the law, introduced 
with little civil society input, has not led to material benefits for CSOs that work 
in fields such as human rights and governance, and that pursue accountability 
and advocacy activities. Most often, it has resulted in large companies setting 
up corporate foundations rather than channelling resources through civil society, 
and the activities that such foundations fund are overwhelmingly charitable and 
oriented around social welfare, rather than activities focused on the realisation 
of rights. Much of the resourcing has also gone into faith-based causes or causes 
associated with political elites. It is also noted that there is a lack of fit in values 
and worldviews between rights-oriented CSOs and many large corporations, par-
ticularly extractive industries; CSOs may be working to hold large corporations to 
account and expose them for human rights abuses and poor governance and ac-
countability practices, which makes them unlikely partners to receive corporate 
resources. A reluctance of companies to support CSOs that advocate for human 
rights and good governance is seen elsewhere, including in Brazil and Panama.
One consequence of the new law in India has been some increased civil society 
division, between those CSOs that accept funding from corporations with poor 
reputations or try to work with private foundations, and those that stand against 
this. A further development has been the loss of some CSO staff to private foun-
dations, as they can afford to pay staff more than CSOs.
Competition between CSOs and private foundations is seen elsewhere: in Brazil, 
large companies also tend to set up private foundations, which compete with 
CSOs for visibility and recognition. It is estimated that over two-thirds of Brazilian 
CSR goes to corporate-managed projects. The limited funding that companies 
in the Philippines provide for CSOs, as opposed to support that is channelled to 
their private foundations, tends to go to a few areas of activity, such as disaster 
response and education. In Honduras, it is also assessed that the legal framework 
encourages corporations to set up private foundations rather than give to CSOs.
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Conclusion
The EENA assessments identify challenges of restrictions on the receipt of in-
ternational funding, including new restrictions being imposed by governments, 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of international donors from some situations. 
Meanwhile, domestic state funding is limited in its scope and availability, particu-
larly for CSOs working in areas of human rights and governance, and procedures 
for accessing domestic state funds are often opaque, unpredictable and incline 
towards corruption and favouritism. Domestic philanthropic environments tend 
to remain weak, with limited cultures of individual giving, poor tax incentives and 
some competition between CSOs and private sector foundations. Smaller and 
newer CSOs generally face particular problems in accessing funding. 
Suggested focal points for future advocacy could be the setting of more enabling 
standards on the receipt of international funding and the development of more 
enabling taxation and philanthropy laws to encourage greater giving to CSOs.
The above analysis suggests that the ability of CSOs to access essential rights 
and resources is highly dependent on the prevailing state of relations between 
governments and CSOs. The assessments paint a mixed picture of relations 
between CSOs and governments, with growing hostility in some contexts, 
cautious optimism in others, and in some countries, the development of new 
structures for cooperation, which show promise but also have challenges.
Political participation
One aspect of the relationship that the EENA examines is the extent to which CSOs 
are able to participate in political processes in order to advance their missions. 
This includes undertaking advocacy, which is possible to some extent in every 
country assessed. The potential for successful advocacy depends on the quality 
of relations, the availability and openness of dialogue structures, the nature of 
the advocacy attempt and the capacity of civil society to engage, issues that are 
explored further below. There is also the question of the extent to which CSOs 
are able to engage around elections, including through election monitoring and 
advocating for candidates that share CSO positions. Countries broadly fall into 
two camps here: those where some kind of political activity is permitted, and 
those where it is strictly prohibited.
As raised in the earlier section on registration, political parties register under the 
same law as some forms of CSOs in Zambia, suggesting some grey areas, while 
other Zambian CSOs take part in election monitoring and related activity around 
elections. CSOs are active in the political sphere in Burkina Faso, including by 
offering training in electoral participation, advocating for quotas for people from 
excluded groups to hold office, and working to support independent candidates. 
CSOs in the Philippines are allowed to support candidates in elections, although 
when they do so, they face challenges of asserting their non-partisan nature. 
There are no specific laws in Honduras that regulate the participation of CSOs in 
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electoral processes, and CSOs are allowed to nominate candidates for political 
office. The law does, however, state that CSOs are to be non-partisan. 
CSOs are free to express their views during election campaigns in Tunisia, but 
otherwise there is a clear demarcation between CSOs and political parties. 
Signalling a desire to move on from a polarised pre-revolutionary era, in which 
CSOs closely connected to the ruling regime were tolerated  but others were 
restricted, the law in Tunisia prohibits people who have senior roles in political 
parties from founding or managing CSOs. Tunisian law also prevents CSOs from 
giving financial support to political parties, but not other forms of support. In 
elections following the revolution, there was some movement of CSO activists 
into elected political positions, but otherwise, CSOs hold strongly to the notion 
of political neutrality. Similarly, there are no explicit provisions preventing the 
political engagement of CSOs in Nepal, but the culture amongst civil society tends 
to be one of political neutrality, and this is often reflected in the statues of CSOs. 
There is also a culture of non-partisanship among CSOs in Panama, although 
there are some non-autonomous bodies that position themselves as part of civil 
society but support parties and politicians; this can damage the credibility of 
legitimate civil society. In Lebanon, some CSOs advocate for the electoral process 
to be improved, but tend to stay out of politics.
CSOs can take part in election observation in Bolivia, but it is a condition of being 
allowed to receive international funding that they do not support political parties 
or candidates. A firmer line is taken in Mexico, where CSOs that are registered 
with the Federal Registry of CSOs under the 2004 Law on Promotion or are 
authorised to receive tax deductible donations are banned from electoral and 
political participation. Other CSOs are however free to do so.
In Nigeria, apart from election observance, CSOs have no role in the political 
process, and are prohibited from making any gift or donation to a political party 
or for a political purpose, or endorsing or opposing any candidate. Similarly, in 
Benin, CSOs that are registered as NGOs are not allowed to undertake any partisan 
political activity. Further, CSOs that have signed up to the Benin CSO Charter, a 
voluntary, civil society led initiative to encourage good governance standards, 
undertake that their directors will report annually on any political affiliation, and 
that CSO directors must resign if they take up a political post. A concern in Jordan 
is that prohibitions against CSOs taking part in political activities are broad and 
ill-defined, leaving considerable scope for discretion by officials.
In summary, therefore, while laws vary, even when they are more permissive, 
CSOs tend to be cautious about engaging in the political sphere, and in the main 
hold to practices of non-partisanship.
Relations of mistrust
More generally, there are several contexts, including Bolivia, Honduras, India 
and South Africa, where there is assessed to be a level of government hostility 
towards CSOs, and mutual distrust. There is CSO scepticism and distrust about 
the quality of engagement opportunities in Jordan, and in Honduras, CSOs have 
little faith that their opinions will be taken into account. In Panama, CSOs believe 
the government has no real interest in opening itself up to public input, including 
through engagement with CSOs. Relations are assessed to be deteriorating in 
Uganda, and they worsened in Zambia during the process of developing a new 
constitution, which fuelled polarisation. In India, attacks have been made on 
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CSOs in political speech, with frequent government questioning of the role that 
CSOs should play. This has affected the ability of CSOs to operate: government 
accusations that CSOs have a negative impact on development and the economy 
have been accompanied by increased restrictions on the work of international 
CSOs in India and the ability of Indian CSOs to access international funding, as 
discussed above.
Amid a context of political polarisation in Bolivia, which sees a divide between 
CSOs associated with the government and those that are not, the government 
tends to regard CSOs that refuse to align, and that seek human rights, as enemies. 
Similarly, in South Africa, relationships can be characterised as being of either 
subservience or hostility. Class and status is seen to be a vector in South Africa, 
with both grassroots campaigning organisations and organisations of middle class 
intellectuals more likely to be viewed with hostility, because they are seen to 
challenge government narratives. In Cambodia, because a small number of CSOs 
sided with the political opposition, the government now tends to accuse all CSOs 
that disagree with it of being opposition supporters. In Jordan and South Africa, 
public protests, against poor governance and services, are assessed to have 
caused governments to become more suspicious of CSOs.
Relations often vary depending on what the missions of CSOs are, and how they 
work to achieve their goals. The general pattern, as suggested by the earlier sec-
tion on CSO operation, is that governments tolerate and often welcome the work 
of CSOs to deliver services, support development projects and engage in social 
welfare and charitable activities, but become more hostile when CSOs seek to 
advance human rights, promote good governance and accountability, and engage 
in advocacy. This is observed, for example, in Cambodia, India, Mozambique, Ni-
geria, Panama, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. In some contexts, including 
India, Jordan, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia, government hostility towards 
some CSOs that engage in accountability and advocacy work, and that receive 
international funding to support such work, sees CSOs described as the agents of 
foreign powers.
When governments divide and constrain civil society in this way, it offers a 
challenge to civil society’s autonomy: civil society may be viewed as a gap-filler 
or sub-contractor, rather than an equal partner with a range of legitimate roles to 
play. The danger is that civil society’s ability to fulfil a full range of roles is being 
challenged. The provision of services to impoverished and excluded people is a 
valuable function of civil society, particularly as civil society can reach populations 
that governments cannot, but often a grounding in work with impoverished and 
excluded people will naturally lead civil society to seek policy change, greater 
accountability and the rebalancing of power. These should be seen as connected 
and equally legitimate functions, but in several contexts, attempts are being 
made to narrow down civil society’s role. As discussed earlier, challenges can 
particularly arise when CSOs are involved in funding partnerships with their 
governments.
There has been hostility and attempts to challenge the autonomy of CSOs in 
Lebanon, although a gradual, more positive shift in relations is observed, albeit 
relations still fall short of genuine partnership. Notably, some of this shift has 
come at the instigation of international donors. This connects to a concern raised 
in Nigeria, about the space for engagement being externally defined by donors. 
When good relations are dependent on donor interventions, this also raises 
troubling questions about the autonomy of civil society and the sustainability of 
the space for engagement.
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Gaps between policy and practice
Sometimes positive statements about the role of CSOs are not reflected in pol-
icies for engagement, and often there is a gap between what policies say about 
engagement and the reality in practice. The key concerns that arise are with to-
kenism - that engagement opportunities do not provide real opportunities for 
influence, and may be used to legitimise flawed processes - the lack of structured, 
ongoing opportunities for engagement, and government control of participation 
in engagement processes, leading to accusations of selectivity, favouritism and 
patronage.
For example, in Jordan the government may describe CSOs as partners in its 
official rhetoric, but some CSOs and activists have also received threats from 
state security agencies. Similarly, in Honduras, government discourse about the 
partnership role of civil society sits at odds with the government’s increasing-
ly authoritarian actions. Consequently, while the government of Honduras has 
created some dialogue spaces, when civil society attempts to use these to raise 
concerns on key issues, including human rights and governance, the government 
disregards these and keeps them off the agenda. In Mexico, notwithstanding the 
development of opportunities, discussed below, civil society scepticism that con-
sultations can influence decisions remains high.
The legal framework in South Africa appears enabling for engagement, but is un-
dercut by poor relations between CSOs and the government. South African CSOs 
largely see themselves as on the margins of decision-making, and may view con-
sultations as tokenistic. Current plans concerning cooperation in Cambodia are 
top-down in their design and do not foresee CSOs playing a full partnership role, 
and there are also concerns about selectivity, tokenism, lack of trust and limited 
space and time for engagement. Challenges noted in Cameroon include selec-
tivity and a lack of openness in some processes, and this may be indicative of a 
broader government absence of trust in CSOs that mean that CSOs that ask ques-
tions about governance are perceived as being unsupportive of the government. 
In Burkina Faso as well, the reality of engagement is assessed to be less enabling 
than it appears on paper.
There is a lack of public policy on dialogue in Jordan, and the only institution-
alised dialogue body, the Jordan Economic and Social Council, is selected by the 
government, under-utilised and lacking in influence. Institutionalised processes 
are assessed to be lacking in Nigeria, with at best tokenistic opportunities avail-
able; there is some CSO participation in specific government committees, but 
this is at the behest of government and lacks credibility, while participation in 
government organised events is variable. There is an absence of an overall frame-
work to manage engagement in Mozambique, and the government is assessed 
to be reluctant to share information that would help engagement, in a situation 
where the state is seen to distrust many CSOs. CSOs may be invited into law and 
policy-making arenas in Lebanon, but this tends to be sporadic, and there is no 
obligation to take the views of CSOs into account. 
Functioning mechanisms for dialogue are also lacking in Cambodia: some exist-
ing structures are not convened regularly, including those that were considered 
most open to civil society input, while Technical Working Groups are usually lim-
ited to a single CSO representative. Similarly, sessions of the Observatories of De-
velopment in Mozambique, which are supposed to foster engagement, are held 
only when the government wishes, and are often postponed or cancelled. There 
are also some non-operational mechanisms in Panama, and Colombia, where 
dialogue is assessed to be fragmented, with several mechanisms mandated by 
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the constitution not functioning, because of mistrust and limited understanding 
of these opportunities among both CSOs and the government. The established 
mechanism in Lebanon, the Economic and Social Council, is not being convened.
In Zambia, while there are some dialogue processes, these are assessed to be un-
dermined by a lack of trust between CSOs and the government. Even in Nepal and 
Tunisia, where relations have recently improved, CSOs assess that there is a lack 
of institutionalised dialogue. In Nepal, dialogue is mostly conducted on the basis 
of an agenda set by the government, with no guarantee that the government will 
heed the input of civil society. In Tunisia, engagement comes mostly when civil 
society demands it, rather than by a conscious decision of the government to 
involve civil society proactively. Cooperation is assessed to be growing gradually 
in Burkina Faso, but with some continuing reluctance by state officials towards 
involving civil society. 
Bolivia’s new constitution and the corresponding Participation and Social Man-
agement Law of 2013 make legal provisions for civil society participation in the 
design of laws and policies, and give CSOs the right to propose these. This entails 
the establishment of new structures for engagement. However, this is undercut 
by the principle of alignment, as discussed earlier, which seeks to limit CSOs to 
the framework set by the country’s plans, policies and systems. Further, it has 
been observed so far that participation has not led to influence, and there has 
been little feedback on proposals made by CSOs. To date, consultations have 
been on laws that have already been created, suggesting an approach to consul-
tation that is formal rather than deep, and a selective approach to participation is 
being taken, with only CSOs that support government policies invited. Influence 
is sometimes elusive in Colombia as well, because civil society input is treated as 
only advisory, and need not be heeded.
While Uganda has a National NGO Policy that sets mechanisms for CSO input to 
the National Development Plan and other programmes, CSOs note that invita-
tions to meetings often come at short notice, giving them little time to prepare, 
and often the crucial decisions have been made before CSOs are consulted, in 
what remains a top-down process. This leads to criticisms of tokenism, and of 
patronage relationships with selected CSOs. Short notice and lack of time to pre-
pare is also an issue in Zambia. 
In Cambodia, the practical effects of a lack of dialogue on the environment for 
civil society are well understood: because it is not directly exposed to civil society 
critique, it is easier for the government to pass poor or ill-considered laws and 
regulations that negatively impact on the environment for civil society. In Cam-
bodia, pseudo CSOs, organised by the government (often referred to as GONGOs, 
government-organised NGOs), were also used to confer an air of apparent legiti-
macy and crowd out the concerns of legitimate civil society on consultations held 
on the LANGO.
Informal relations and relations at different levels
The absence of structured mechanisms for CSOs to engage with the government 
in Jordan leaves CSOs relying on their informal, personal connections with offi-
cials and decision-makers to advance civil society agendas. While this shows civil 
society ingenuity and flexibility in difficult circumstances, such informal methods 
lack transparency and clear criteria, and miss opportunities for broader civil soci-
ety collaboration that could be enabled by more structured processes of engage-
ment.
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It is assessed that the extent of cooperation in the Philippines often depends on 
the inclination of key officials, who act as gatekeepers to processes, and there 
is enduring concern that opportunities for CSOs remain vulnerable to changes 
in political office holders. There is concern in India, Lebanon and Nepal as well 
that access to engagement opportunities for CSOs depends on the attitudes of 
individual ministers and officials, with some office holders much more favourably 
inclined towards civil society than others. 
It is also harder in the Philippines for CSOs to engage at the local government lev-
el, where clear policies on CSO participation are often not properly implemented 
by officials, who may limit participation, exercise favouritism or involve CSOs in 
tokenistic ways, to the point that some CSOs are concerned that they are being 
used to legitimise flawed processes. Similarly, in Tunisia, some CSOs assess that 
engagement is harder at the local level, where CSO participation is often only 
formal and favouritism is exercised. CSOs report that they are hindered in ad-
dressing these challenges by a lack of knowledge on processes and procedures to 
settle disputes. There is also assessed to be little local level interaction in Lebanon 
and Nigeria, and greater suspicion of CSOs and stronger interference at the local 
government level in Uganda. A need to strengthen relationships at the local level 
is also identified in Tajikistan.
In comparison, while relationships are often characterised by hostility at the na-
tional level, Cambodian civil society finds more positive working relationships at 
sub-national levels of government, and with individual ministries with which they 
engage in the course of their work. In Zambia as well, partnerships are assessed 
to be stronger at the local level, with a recent trend of creating sub-national co-
ordinating committees.
There may also be more space to engage with parliaments than with the execu-
tive, something that is assessed to be the case in Mozambique. In comparison, 
Ugandan CSOs feel that the space to engage with parliament is limited.
More positive examples
There are, however, some more positive recent examples of the development of 
structured cooperation between CSOs and the government, although these all 
give rise to further challenges. A strong recent example comes from Brazil, with 
the development of the Partnership Cooperation Agreement, as discussed in the 
section on access to resources. The new law holds promise to encourage govern-
ment officials to see CSOs as full partners and enable CSOs to make proposals to 
government. It can be seen to be building on routines and practices of coopera-
tion that have developed in recent decades, in which CSOs have played a part in 
proposing and advocating for laws. The process has been one of gradually build-
ing trust and respect for the autonomous contributions of CSOs. Such partnership 
ways of working were intended to be formalised in the Social Participation Na-
tional Policy and the National System of Participation, but Brazil’s currently polar-
ised politics have seen these most recent developments stalled. Notwithstanding 
progress, there also remains some criticism that participation mechanisms are 
still geared more towards discussion than action, and that much depends on the 
attitude of particular officials and government structures at different levels. 
CSOs in Nepal assess that the new constitution, passed in 2015, has potential to 
mark a decisive break with the country’s history of civil conflict and provides new 
opportunities for collaboration and improved relations. There are now numerous 
government committees and other spaces across a wide range of government 
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bodies in which CSOs participate. For example, the Ministry of Women, Children 
and Social Welfare has established a new team on civil society, and there are CSO 
desks in many local government bodies. Nepal’s new law on local government 
also mandates local government bodies to work with, encourage and provide 
assistance to CSOs. Nepali CSOs feel they can claim credit for helping to secure 
economic, legal and social policy changes, and relations between CSOs and the 
government are also said to have been strengthened as a result of effective 
cooperation in responding to the April 2015 earthquake.
In Tunisia, CSOs have had to move from a position of protest to one of 
participation, as relations have transformed, from polarised and adversarial to 
more positive and cooperative relations, following the revolution. Civil society 
was recognised as playing an essential role in the aftermath of the revolution, 
in steering the country towards relative peace, a functioning democracy and a 
new constitution that is much more pluralist than before, and which positions 
Tunisia as a participatory democratic republic in which the role of civil society 
is recognised. This is realised in part through a new ministry for constitutional 
bodies, civil society and human rights.
Tunisian CSOs have engaged in tripartite dialogue with the government and 
EU representatives, and can see that they have been able to influence both 
the government, for example on bringing forward legislation on gender-based 
violence, and the EU’s relations with Tunisia. As part of the new democratic 
settlement in Tunisia, CSOs are able to propose and submit bills to parliamentary 
committees, and take part in hearing sessions with the national assembly. 
CSOs have developed the capacities to make practical recommendations to 
decision-makers that are framed by the constitution and Tunisia’s international 
obligations, and can see that their engagement has influenced some new laws. 
The government also shows signs of acknowledging that it is easier to introduce 
new measures when it has civil society support.
Against this, well-argued civil society inputs are sometimes rejected in Tunisia 
for political reasons or reasons that are poorly communicated, while dialogues 
sometimes produce no results. Tunisian CSOs also criticise the limited information 
made available on the development of new legislative measures, and on the 
opportunities for civil society input in these. There are also current concerns that, 
after a positive period, relations are deteriorating and the range of what may be 
discussed is narrowing. This serves as a reminder that CSO-government relations 
are always dynamic and subject to a range of influences, and need ongoing 
monitoring and nurturing.
The relationship in the Philippines is also assessed to have progressed from a 
previously adversarial one to a relationship that now sits on a spectrum from 
critical engagement to cooperation, with some partnerships. Government 
officials are seen to have become more open to the involvement of CSOs, in the 
implementation of government projects and in participation in decision-making 
processes. This is seen as a gradual realisation of constitutional provisions that 
recognise the right of civil society to participate in economic, political and social 
decision-making, and mandates the state to create consultation mechanisms. In 
Mexico as well, opportunities are seen to have gradually opened for CSOs and 
citizens to propose and advocate for legislation.
In the Philippines, there are also structured mechanisms of cooperation, includ-
ing the National Anti-Poverty Commission, in which CSOs and government repre-
sentatives work together, and there was significant CSO participation in the draft-
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ing of the Philippine Development Plan, a role that came about as a result of CSO 
advocacy. The government’s bottom-up-budgeting initiative has in addition cre-
ated opportunities for CSOs to participate in budgeting and budget monitoring. It 
is mandatory for national agencies to consult with CSOs on a range of agricultural 
and environmental issues, and CSOs are members of numerous public bodies, 
chiefly those concerned with agricultural, environmental and planning issues. 
Relations have however been strained in the Philippines by the difficulties that 
CSOs now experience in obtaining domestic state funding under new regulations, 
and suspicion of CSOs that has grown following the fake CSOs corruption scandal, 
discussed earlier.
There are also concerns about the capacity of CSOs to cooperate in the Phil-
ippines, as CSOs may lack the skills and knowledge required to play their role 
properly, such as legal expertise and knowledge of local government procedures. 
There is very little funding available to develop this capacity. CSOs in Colombia, 
Lebanon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda, and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, 
also assess that they have weak capacity to undertake activities such as engaging 
and monitoring.
Conclusion
In summary, it can be said that views are mixed on CSO-government relations. 
There are some good examples of growing cooperation, but also political hostility 
by some governments towards CSOs. In general, CSOs are less tolerated when 
they aim to promote human rights and good governance, and engage in advocacy 
and accountability activity. Even when there are solid structures for cooperation, 
there are concerns about how open, transparent, inclusive and meaningful those 
structures are, and in other contexts, the lack of ongoing, institutional structures 
is a problem. Relations may vary between individual ministries and office holders, 
with a consistent partnership approach across governments generally lacking. 
There are also concerns about how the autonomy of civil society can be pre-
served when partnering with governments.
A suggested focal point for future advocacy could be the research, documenta-
tion and dissemination of successful models of engagement, which identifies the 
benefits that strong engagement has unlocked for governments and citizens, and 
the encouragement of greater adoption of good practice.
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The overall picture revealed by the EENA research is one of gaps. There are gaps 
between international best practice, which recognises the autonomy of civil so-
ciety, and laws and regulations that impinge on this. There are gaps between the 
enabling language of constitutions, which promise to uphold the fundamental 
civil society rights, of association, peaceful assembly and expression, and laws 
and regulations that undercut these and place excessive restrictions on those 
rights. There are gaps between the stated purpose of laws and how laws are ap-
plied in practice, with broad and vague provisions in laws often giving govern-
ments and officials wide scope for discretion. There are gaps between national 
level policies and the practices at the local level, which are often less enabling in 
some regions of countries. Additionally, policies and practices are vulnerable to 
discrimination, politicisation and corruption.
On many of the key dimensions assessed in this study, there seems to be a clear 
distinction between notification regimes and approval regimes. While failing to 
respect the autonomy of civil society sufficiently, notification regimes can leave 
CSOs with the space to start themselves up, operate, secure resources, hold 
events and express their viewpoints. Approval regimes on the other hand im-
pose the state as gatekeeper at every step, giving the government the power to 
interfere, amend or block CSO activity, slowing down the inherent creativity and 
dynamism of civil society. Where notification regimes apply, they need to exist in 
reality and not just on paper; in practice, even under notification regimes, gov-
ernments and officials often have scope to interpret a requirement to notify as a 
request for approval.
Not all CSOs are affected equally. In the main, these challenges are visited far 
more on CSOs that take stances on issues with which governments disagree than 
those that hold positions supportive of governments. CSOs that seek human 
rights, democracy and good governance fare worse than those that deliver social 
welfare and development services. Urban and large CSOs may have advantages 
that enable them to navigate hurdles, cover costs and cultivate relationships in 
difficult regulatory environments; rural, small, new and informal CSOs may fare 
worse in disenabling environments.
By and large, CSOs do not seek an environment entirely free of regulation. The 
existence of enabling regulation as part of a broader enabling environment helps 
CSOs to prove that they are genuine and legitimate, that they spend money wise-
ly and serve their constituencies. Enabling regulation can be the starting point 
for deeper and more constructive relations between CSOs and governments that 
lead to strong partnerships. It can help CSOs distinguish themselves from bodies 
that lack legitimacy, or that are corrupt or defunct. But the lesson of the EENA 
research is that too often CSO regulation is far from enabling. When it should 
be transparent, predictable and inclusive, it is opaque, erratic and selective. It is 
often motivated by a determination to control and constrain civil society, rather 
than a desire to enable it. Where the environment for civil society is disenabling, 
CSOs face increased challenges of cost, time and energy, and the scope for discre-
tion, favouritism and corruption increases at the government level, undermining 
the rule of law.
The EENA research has revealed that, in very different contexts in diverse parts 
of the world, there are some remarkable similarities in the challenges that CSOs 
face. The positive side of this is that CSO responses to disenabling conditions that 
conclusion
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prove successful in one context may hold potential for adaption and replication 
in others. As this report’s accompanying paper on civil society response strategies 
makes clear, civil society is fighting back, working collectively and winning some 
important gains. An understanding of these should form the basis for future ac-
tion to make the environment for civil society more predictable, functional and 
enabling.
conclusion
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Annex 1:  
Enabling Environment National Assess-
ments partners
Country National partner Years of  assessment
Benin Groupe d’Action pour le Progrès et la Paix (GAPP) 2015-2016
Bolivia Fundación Construir 2013-2014
Brazil
Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamen-
tais (ABONG)
2014-2015
Burkina Faso
Réseau des Organisations de la Société Civile pour le Dé-
veloppement (RESOCIDE)
2013-2014
Cambodia Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) 2013-2014
Cameroon
Collectif des ONG pour la Sécurité Alimentaire et Le Déve-
loppement Rural (COSADER)
2014-2015
Colombia Confederación Colombiana de ONG (CCONG) 2015-2016
Honduras
Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para 
el Desarrollo de Honduras (FOPRIDEH)
2015-2016
India Voluntary Action Network India (VANI) 2013-2014
Jordan Phenix Center for Economic and Informatics Studies 2014-2015
Lebanon Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND) 2013-2014
Mexico Centro Mexicano para la Filantropía (CEMEFI) 2013-2014
Mozambique JOINT - Liga de ONGs em Mocambique 2014-2015
Nepal NGO Federation of Nepal (NPN) 2014-2015
Nigeria Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO) 2014-2015
Panama Alianza Ciudadana Pro Justicia 2014-2015
Philippines Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) 2015-2016
South Africa Human Rights Institute of South Africa (HURISA) 2014-2015
Tajikistan Tajikistan National NGO Association 2015-2016
Tunisia Al Kawakibi Democracy Transition Centre (KADEM) 2015-2016
Uganda Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF) 2013-2014
Zambia Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) 2013-2014
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